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PROFESSIONALISM CONSEQUENCES OF LAW
FIRM INVESTMENTS IN CLIENTS: AN
EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
Royce de R. Barondes"
Increasing attention has recently been focused on the financial
interests in clients held by professionals participating in securities
offerings.
Much of the attention has addressed accountants.
Recently, PricewaterhouseCoopers settled administrative charges
brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which
alleged widespread violations of rules limiting interests in firms being
audited.' The big five accounting firms subsequently agreed with the
SEC to study the extent of their compliance with then-existing rules.2

* Effective September 2002, Associate Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia School
of Law. The author, in his preparation of this article benefitted from conversations with
Alex Butlcr, Jcff Netter, Kelley Pace, Cary Sanger and from the written comments of two
anonymous referees. This article received a 2001 Holmes-Cardozo Outstanding Conference
Paper Award from the Academy of Legal Studies in Business.

' PWC Settles SEC Charges It Violated Auditor Independence Rules, 31 Sec. Reg. & L Rep.
(BNA) 119 (Jan. 22, 1999).
2 Steve Burkholder & Phyllis Diamond, Big Five Firms to Take Partin Voluntary Independence

Program, 32 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 795 (June 12, 2000).
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Most recently, the SEC adopted new rules regulating auditor
independence.'
Similar questions have also, to a lesser extent, been raised
concerning law firms. Although law firm interests in clients being
taken public have historically been considered taboo,4 popular
accounts indicate law firms are increasingly taking equity interests in6
their clients.' These investments and relationships merit attention.
Proper functioning of the securities markets depends in part on the
reliable provision of services by professionals (lawyers, accountants,
and investment banks) that assist companies in bringing to market

' Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, Securities Act
Release No. 7919, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008 (Dec. 5, 2000). Recent evidence indicates the scope
of non-audit services provided by accounting firms is greater than was previously recognized.
Lawrcncc Abbott ct al.,Audi4 ]Vn Audit and Informiation Tec/mologv Fees: Suim E mpbival Euidetce
12 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), http://papers.ssrn.com/
paper.taf?abstractid= 265951.
t John C. Coffee,Jr., The New Compensation, N.Y.LJ., Mar. 16, 2000, at 5. But see Shawn
Ncidorf, Silicon V7alLy Luyers Embrace VC-Likcc Role, VLNTURI. CAPITALJ., Oct. 1999, at 35
(stating that lawyers in the Silicon Valley area, and a few others, have invested in clients for
decades).
' Eg., Debra Baker, Who Wants to Be a Millonaire?:Law FirmsInvestinginHot High-Tech IPOs
Are Making a Fortune, but Some Critics Wony the Stock Craze Is Clouding Ethics Matters, A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 2000, at 36; Sheldon I. Banoff, When Can Law Firms and Lawyers Accept Stock or Stock
Optionsfor Services?, ACCT. FOR L. FIRMS, Sept. 2000, at 3; Coffee, supra note 4; Cornelia
Wallis Honch, Stock an Option to Attom. Fees, but Put It in Writing, Ciii. DALY L. BULL., Oct.
13, 2000, at 5; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-418
(2000); Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof'l &Judicial Ethics, Formal Op.
2000-3 (2000), http://www.abcny.org/eth2000.htm#20003;Jason M. Klein, No Fool Fora
Client. The Finance and Incentives Behind Stock-Based Compensationfor Corporate Attorneys, 1999
CoI.UM. Bus. L. RI.v. 330, 331.
Some malpractice insurance policies limit the amount of these investments. 2 RONALI)
E. MAI.I.EN &JI.I.I'R[.;Y M. SMITH, LEGAL MAIPRACTICI" 668 (5th ed. 2000).
6 CfJOsIPH S. O'FIAHIEATY, GOING PUBI.IC 59-60 (1984) ("[C]ompany counsels who
own stoch in ventures are placed in a confusing position. In one part of their minds they are
concerned as shareholders about the value of their stock, and thuo their financial
involvement may distort their professional and dispassionate thinking on their clients
problems."); JAMI,;S B. ARKI;BAUER & RON SCHuL'z, GOING PUBLIC 86 (1998) ("The
strongest argument against stock as payment is the potential conflict of interest. Some
company managers may question whether the advice they are receiving is in their interest
or the adviser's interest .... These may seem extreme concerns but should not be ignored
in a decision whether to offer stock for the services of legal counsel.").
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their securities.7 Before securities are marketed, the issuer has private
information. Attempts to sell a portion of the company suggest that
the issuer has private, negative information, which will cause a
downward adjustment in a third party's valuation of the firm.
One role played by professionals in the offering process is to certify
the absence of undisclosed, negative information. This certification
is, in some cases, explicit. In public offerings, an accounting firm will
provide a letter, made available to the public, stating the accounting
firm has performed certain procedures as part of assuring the
company's financial statements have been compiled in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles.' A lawyer will provide
in a publicly available filing an opinion concerning the validity of the
securities being sold.' °
The legal environment makes these
certifications valuable, by imposing potential legal liability where the

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated:
The legal profession plays a unique and pivotal role in the effective implementa
tion of thc scc iG6 1,w. Questions of uohpliancc with tlhc intricate pruisions of
these statntes are ever present and the smooth functioning of the securities markets
vyill bu scioUly diLtub,.d if tlh publiL. Lwuit cly on the expc ic poffec by an
attorney when he renders an opinion on such matters ....
. . . The public trust demands more of its legal advisers than "customary"
activities which prove to be careless.
SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973); see also Emanuel Fields,
Securities Act Release No. 5404, 1973 SEC LEXIS 2816, at * 10 (June 18, 1973) ("Members
of this Commission have pointed out time and time again that the task of enforcing the
securities laws rests in overwhelming measure on the bar's shoulders . . . . [] his
flommlsior with itVsrnall taff limited resources, and onerous ta-sks is peculiarly dependent
on the probity and the diligence of the professionals who practice before it ... This is a field
where .nserupildous laurye can inflirt irreparable hqrm on those who rely on the dicloire
documents that they produce."); Marc J. Steinberg, Corporate Conmsel Roles and .ijablitie^-An
Essayfor Professor Walter Steele, 52 SMU L. REV. 707, 714 (1999) ("The success of our private
and public capital markets is owed in large measure to the integrity and expertise of the
corporate and securities bar,"), Sxgmazally Robert A. Prentice, The SECandAIDP.Implications
ofthe Self-ServingBiasforIndependentAuditing,61 OHIO ST. LJ. 1597, 1601 n. 10 (2000) ("Highquality audits do seem to help keep management honest.").
' Cf Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, InformationalAsynmetries, Financial Structure, and
Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371, 372 (1977) ("We show that the entrepreneur's
willingness to invest in his own project can serve as a signal of project quality .... The value
of the firm increases with the share of the firm held by the entrepreneur.").
9 See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02 (2000).
10 See id. §§ 228.601, 229.601.
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certification is not accurate. " The participation of these professionals
also can provide an implicit certification that further mitigates
potential investors' concerns with whether there is undisclosed,
negative information. The professional standing ofthese professionals
may be decreased by assisting issuers who are less than candid, 2
leading to decreased professional fees in the future. Given the
importance of the professionals' services, developments in either the
i egulatory fi
amework governing securities offerings or in professional
practice that potentially jeopardize the fulfilhnent of these roles merit
attention.
Certain aspects of the law firm investments have been detailed.
Popular press reports law firms invest at the times investments are
made by, and at the prices offered to, venture capitalists.'" One
commentator notes:
These investments can occur in all stages of financing, but usually the
lawyer purchases in the earlier financing stages when it is harder for the
company to find sources of money because of the greater risk .... Later,
when venture capitalists dominate the investor list, the lawyer purchases
financing round and eventually stops
a smaller percentage of the
4
purchasing stock altogether.'

The law firm investments are, in some cases, substantial. For
example, Deger notes that at the end of 1999, Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati, a California-based law firm, held stock worth
$230 million in newly-public clients, representing $1.9 million per
partner.' The business plan of another prominent California-based

1 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (1994); see also infia notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
12

Bernard S. Black, The Legal and InstitutionalPreconditionsfor Strong Securities Markets, 48

UCLA L. REV. 781, 787 (2001).
1 Baker, supra note 5.
'4

Gwyneth E. McAlpine, Comment, Getting a Piece of the Action: Should Lawyers Be Allowed

to Invest in Their Clients' Stock?, 47 UCLAL, REV.549, 552 (1999). See generaly Kevin Miller,
Lawyers as Venture Capitalists:An Economic Analysis of v[aw Firms That Invest in Their Clients, 13
HARV.J.L. & TFCH. 435, 444-45 (2000) (describing as the "typical" circumstance one in
which the law firm "defers its billing for the start up company, anticipating that this risk will
bc icp id by the profit opportunity pcovidcd by sofa amount of future iiuvuusinut ih thc
client," x^hich thqt "kuthor diiitignihe from the

"stock-as-fees

mrodel").

Renee Deger, Takring Stock- Hitting the Jackpot, RtCORDER,Jan. 6, 2000, at 1.
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law firm seeks greater revenue from these investments than from fee
income. 16
Reflecting the increased attention focused on these investments, the
investments have been the subject of recent ethics opinions issued by
a number of organizations. Those opinions include the American Bar
Association's Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,17
the Bar of the City of New York Committee on Professional and
Judicial Ethics, 8 the D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committeej the Ethics
Committee of the Mississippi Bar, 20 and the Utah Bar.2 '
In assessing whether these law firm investments are appropriate, it
is crucial to determine whether these investments affect the legal
services performed. It is therefore striking that, with the wealth of
discussion these investments have received,22 the published literature
has not quantitatively examined the relationship between these
investments and performance of professional obligations. The law
frequently has to be developed to regulate an activity where there is
insufficient empirical evidence to reach a definitive conclusion. That
is inherent in the nature of law.23 Yet reliance on mere heuristic

16 Id. (discussing the Venture Law Group). Coffee reports one unidentified firm having
investment earnings per partner of $2 million-more than its earnings from fees. Coffee,

supra note 4.
"7 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, supra note 5 (finding no per se violation
of applicable rules).
1S Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof l &Judicial Ethics, supra note 5.
'8 D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 300 (2000), http://www.dcbar.org/
attomey-resources/opin300.pdf (ownership interest as compensation for legal services not
unethical per se).
20 Ethics Comm. of the Miss. Bar, Mississippi Bar Op. 230 (1995), LEXIS,
Ethics Library,
Ethop File (finding that receipt of a fee in the form of stock does not necessarily create a
conflict of interest in future representations).
21 Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 98-13 (1998), LEXIS, Ethics Library,
Ethop File (finding the arrangement not per se unethical). Older ethics opinions include Va.
State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1593 (1994),
http://www.vacle.org/opinions/1593.TXT (finding receipt of stock for legal services not
improper per se).
22 See supra notes 4-5.
2 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 42-43 (1951) ("[A]ll our cases are
decided, all our arguments are made, on certain... assumptions .... The court must decide
the dispute that is before it. It cannot refuse because the job is hard, or dubious, or dangerous
.... If the job is in the first instance to settle disputes which do not otherwie get settled,
then the only way to do it is to do it. And it will not matter so much how it is done, in a
baffling instance, so long as it is done at all.").
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assessments, for example, unsupported reference to the "professionalism" of lawyers,2 4 is inappropriate, where more objective evidence
can be brought to bear. This article provides, to the best of the
author's knowledge, the first empirical assessment of the consequences of these investments.
This article examines two principal hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Law firm investments in clients diminish the extent
to which those law firms require issuers to disclose adverse
information in IPO prospectuses.
Hypothesis 2: Those law firms that are willing to invest in their
clients are generally less aggressive in requiring their clients, in their
IPOs, to disclose adverse information in their IPO prospectuses.
To investigate these hypotheses, empirical models were prepared
that examine, in a sample of recent IPOs, the change between the
offer price estimated in the IPO preliminary prospectus and the
actual price realized in the IPO.25 The models then test whether this
change in price is correlated with, among other things, the amount of
equity interest the issuer's law firm has in its client. Because this price
change is, in part, a function of the due diligence performed by an
issuer's lawyer,26 it provides a means for examining that due diligence
and enables one to gather empirical evidence bearing on the effect of
law firm investments in clients. The results suggest that law firm

21 Seegenerally Baker, supranote 5, at 36 (" [Edward H.] Cohen, whose [ABA] Business Law

Section subcommittee plans to complete its report in coming months, says that the potential
for conflicts is not a serious one.").
21 Pricing of an IPO proceeds in three phases. The first price is an estimate proposed
when an investment banker is selected (commonly called the "beauty pageant" price). A
second price appears in the preliminary prospectus published after some of the due diligence
of the professionals involved. The actual IPO price is established on the date of issue. See
Beauty pageant prices are not
infra notes 100-16 (detailing the pricing process).
However the preliminary
systematically reported. See infra text preceding note 123.
prorpectus price has been used as a proxy for the beauty pageant price. &-Cinfra note 152
and accompanying text. Following that methodology, this article uses the prospectus price
as a "proxy" for the beauty pageant price. See infra notes 125-32 (explaining why the
prospectus price is likely to mirror the beauty pageant price). Hence, the study seeks to
compare the price of the offering prior to due diligence with the price after disclosures are
made.
2' See infra notes 123-32.

2002 / Investment in Clients / 385
investment in issuing clients may indeed reduce the amount of
negative disclosure in IPO prospectuses.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Part I details
the applicable rules of professional ethics that are implicated by these
investments. In sum, those rules require the law firm be able tojustify
that the terms of the investment are reasonable to the client. In
discussing those rules, Part I identifies certain latent concerns, not
previously identified, which may materially inhibit the ability of a law
firm to justify the reasonableness of the terms of its investment.
Pat t H exarines the impact of these investnents on that alignmr eiii
of interests and, in particular, addresses the contours of applicable
federal securities laws. Although the scholarly literature addressing
these law firm investments is sparse,2 7 one aspect that has been
addressed is the extent to which these investments beneficially align
the interests of a law firm and its client. Given the role fulfilled by
law firms in securities offerings,28 it is not clear that increasing the
alignment of these interests is desirable. In particular, the incentive
created by these investments can be in favor of less disclosure of
negative information than is in the best interests of the client (as well
as the public). The discussion in Part II demonstrates that one cannot
reach a definitive conclusion of the consequences of these investmnts
from a merely theoretical analysis. An empirical analysis can provide
additional, relevant information.
The remainder of the article focuses on the empirical evidence,
Part III describes the mechanics of an IPO relevant to developing an
empirical assessment of the relationship between law firm investments
and lawyers' performance of professional obligations. Part IV
provides the details of the empirical models developed, presents the
results, and considers the implications of those results, including the
benefits of requiring increased disclosure of the terms of these
investments. The article concludes with some reflections on the
extent to which these investments can influence whether engaging a
law firm that has a financial interest in its client can affect the extent
to which due diligence obligations can be fulfilled by reliance on the
services of that law firm.

27 The relevnnt

lqw review articles

re Miller, qipra note 14, Klein,

McAlpine, supra note 14.
28 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.

supra note 5, qnrt

386 / Vol. 39 / American Business Law Journal

I. ETHICAL RESTRICTIONS ON LAW FIRM INVESTMENTS

IN

CLIENTS

Some law firm investments in clients arise from the law firm's
participation in a pre-IPO round of equity financing. 9 Where the
law firm purchases securities from its client, that transaction would be
a "business transaction with a client," the propriety of which is
governed by Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8.30 Other
investments by legal counsel in their clients arise from the law firm31
taking all or a portion of its fees in the form of securities of the client.
This forin of investrnent inplicates two distinct ethical issues. Fiist,
as is the case with all fee arrangements, a fee arrangement taking this
form is subject to the requirements of Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.5 that "[a] lawyer's fee shall be reasonable., 32 Second,the
acquisition of a client's securities in payment of a fee also can be
construed as consunmating a "business transaction with a client"
subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8.
The contours of the relevant rules are as follows:
A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;

See supra text accompanying note 14.
a'MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (1999).
31 E.g., McAlpine, supra note 14, at 557. Taking securities is only one novel form of
-wyer
have oiight for fee- in lieu nf c"sh See, eg,
finsnri-l interest in !ani'sser that
Bauerrneister v. MeReynolds, 571 N.W.2d 79,83 (Neb. 1997) (fee in the form of a royalty
us snatLeril delivercd to a landfill), ndivfld, 575 N.W.2d 354 (Ntb.1998), iL. Cumin. on
the Rules of Prof l Conduct, Formal Op,94-15 (1994), TEXIS, Ethics Library, Ethop File
(approsr0ng the retention off partl 3nig-nment of pqtent rights as a fee for prowciiting the
patent); Ethics Comin, of the Miss, Bar, Mis3issippi Bar Op. 202 (1992), IFXIS, Ethic3
Library, Ethop File (allowing a contingency fee based on product sales in exchange for "use
[of] the law firm to open doors to potential purchasers, and negotiate an),deals and contracts
regarding the sale of the new product," but strongly advising against this form of
arrangement).
12 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (1999).
" See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. In addition, this form of arrangement
might be considered a contingent fee. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof'l
& Judicial Ethics, supra note 5 (discussing the issue). Treating the arrangement as a
contingent fee would also implicate disclosure requirements. Id.
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(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the result obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
34
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or
knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary
interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest
are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted
in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood
by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.35

As to the financial terms of the investment or fee, the burden of
proving the reasonableness of the arrangement lies on the law firm.36

14

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 1.5(a) (1999).

Id. R. 1.8(a).

36 In re A. H. Robins Co., 86 F.3d 364, 374 (4th Cir. 1996) (fee agreement); McKenzie
Constr., Inc. v. Maynard, 758 F.2d 97, 100 (3d Cir. 1985) (fee agreement); Greene v.

Greene, 436 N.E.2d 496, 499 (N.Y. 1982) (addressing the propriety of a trust agreement
under which the defendant.lawyer was a co.trustee); Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y.
Comm. on Prof'l & Judicial Ethics, supra note 5 (addressing the issue in the context of
discussing the requirement that fees be reasonable); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 42 (1998), LEXIS, 2ndary Library, Lawgvl File; 2 MAILLN &
SMITH, supra note 5, at 643-45, 661 (addressing investments in clients and other contracts
between counsel and client). ContraJacobs v. Holston, 434 N.E.2d 738, 741 (Ohio Ct. App.
1980) (not placing the burden on the attorney to demonstrate the reasonableness of a fee
arrangement entered into before the representation begins).
Anderson and Steele assert that, in practice meeting this burden is particularly difficult
for lawyers, compared with the corresponding burden imposed at common law on other
fiduciaries who contract with clients. Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele,Jr., Ethics
(ud the Law of ContractJuxtaposed: A Jawidiced View of Profesional _hdrility Considerations in the
Attornfy-Client Relationship, 4 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 791, 793, 800-04 (1991).
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This article will not attempt to distinguish between the
"reasonableness" test of Rule 1.5 and the "fair and reasonable"
requirements of Rule 1.8."
Various circumstances may make it difficult, however, for a law
firm to fulfill its burden of proving the reasonableness of the terms of
its investment.3" To confirm the reasonableness of the arrangement,
a law firm would need to reference either a market price for the
securities in question or some substitute for a market price. Where
the client has not previously consummated an IPO, there almost
invariably will not be a public market in the securities the law firm
acquires. 9
Paying professional fees, in whole or in part, with securities has
become increasingly common.40 That increases the likelihood that
this form of benchmark transaction will be available for purposes of
valuing securities acquired by a law firm from its client. However,
the value of the services provided by another professional may not be
subject to easy determination. Where that is the case, those
transactions do not assist in assessing the value of law firm
investments.

" In addition to the referenced ethical principles, a transaction between a client and a
la yer could be subject to scrutiny under common law fiduciary principles. McAlpine, supra
note 14, at 559-61. For purposes of this examination, no distinction will be drawn between
the various applicable tests of fairness, although there might be one in practice. See infra note
47.
See generally D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., supra note 19, at 4 n.3 (2000) ("Where the
stock received by the lawycr is not publicly traded, its value at the time it is transferred to the
la,.yer may be difficult to determine, a factor that may further complicate the Rule 1.5(a)
analysis.").
" Occasionally, a public market could develop for such an issuer's securities. That trading would be in securities preiously issued in a private placeren that h d hccn held for a
sufficient time so that the initial investor no longer could be considered an underwiter under
section 2 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1 1) (1994), on the resale of the
securities. In the ordinary circumstance, however, there would be no public market for the
securities acquired by a law firm from a client that had not previously consummated an IPO.
" Compare Cindy Krischer Goodman, StockBecoming Payment ofChiceforProfessionalsServiitg
Dot-corns, MIAMI HERALD, May 16, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File
(stating that consultants, accountants, recruiters, public relations firms and advertising
agencies are taking fees in the form of stock), and Jerry Useem, New Ethics or No Ethics?
QuestionableBehavior Is Silicon Valey3 Net Big Thing, FORTUNE, Mai. 20, 2000, at 82 (stating
that consulting firms are taking fees in the form of equity and executive search firms are
taking interests in their clients), with Miller, supra note 6, at 445 (asserting "other service
providers or suppliers" do not acquire equity interests).
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Alternatively, one might look to sales of securities in prior rounds
ofpre-IPO equity financing.4 It would appear that, were recent sales
made, they could provide an appropriate benchmark for valuing
securities sold to a law firm.
Various factors, however, can make those sales not comparable.
In particular, finance research indicates a venture capital investment
provides a benefit over and above the money conveyed to the firm in
which the investment is made. The investment by a venture capital
firm conveys information about the firm in which the investment is
made-a positive assessment of an investment in the firm. In sum,
the investment represents an implicit certification. Disclosing this
investment to other potential investors can decrease future costs of
raising capital. Thus, for example, Megginson and Weiss find
"underpricing" is reduced where a venture capitalist has an invest42
ment in the firm.
"Underpricing" refers to the difference between the price at which
stock is sold to the public in an IPO and the market price shortly
thereafter. 3 The well-documented average difference, on the order
of fifteen percent," represents a cost to a firm selling stock in an IPO.
The findings of Megginson and Weiss-that venture capital backing
reduces IPO underpricing-indicate venture capital firms provide
benefits by investing over and above their capital contributions and
any other networking (beneficial access to partners) or similar services
they provide. The venture capital investment provides some
certification to prospective investors who therefore need less
compensation, in the form of purchasing below the market price, to
make an investment.

4' See 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 5, at 665 (suggesting that adjustment may be
required where the benchmark transaction occurred more than three months before the law
firm's investment).
42 William L. Megginson & Kathleen A. Weiss, Venture CapitalistCertificationin InitialPublic

Offerings, 46J. FIN. 879, 880 (1991).
4' E.g., Richard Carter & Steven Manaster, InitialPublic Offerings and UndeniterReputation,
45J. FIN. 1045, 1045 (1990).
4 See Rogcr C. Ibbot3on, PricePerformance of Common StockNew Issues, 2J. FIN. EcON. 235
(1975) (11.4%); Robert E. Miller & Frank K. Reilly, An Examination ofMisprici Returns, and
UncertaintyforInitial Public Offerings, FIN. MGMT., Summer 1987, at 33, 34, 38 (9.9%);Jay R.
Ritter, The Long-Run Performance ofInitial Public Offerings, 46J. FIN. 3 (1991) (16.4%). These
price changes are occasionally much larger. E.g., Baker, supranote 5 (noting a 698% one-day
return for one IPO).
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A law firm does not necessarily provide the identical certification
"service" when it takes an investment in a client, whether in exchange
for legal services or for cash.4 5 This fact affects the utility of the value
of an investment by a venture capitalist as a benchmark for value of
a law firm investment. If the law firm is purchasing securities for cash
at the same time, and at the same price, as a venture capital firm, the
law firm is providing only part of the consideration the venture
capital firm provides. Therefore, one could argue the law firm is, by
definition, acquiring a better-than-market price.
For example, if a venture capital firm pays $10 per share in a preIPO round of equity financing, the value of the venture capitalist's
certification indicates the issuer is receiving something more than $10
per share in consideration. The transaction thus indicates the shares
are worth more than $10 each. One therefore cannot ascertain the
value received by a lawfirm, in exchange for legal services or a cash
investment, by multiplying the number of shares acquired by $10.
That calculation understates the value being received by the law firm.
For a variety of reasons, then, it may be difficult for a law firm to
use terms of securities sales to other firms to form a basis for
determining the reasonableness of the terms of their transactions in
securities of a client. Assessing the reasonableness of a law firm's
investment in its client is further complicated by two additional
factors: the time-frame at which the reasonableness of the
arrangement is assessed and the consequences of illiquidity of the
securities acquired. The reasonableness of an investment in a client
can be measured as of the time of the investment or as of some later
time. At times, market prices of stock sold in an IPO have risen
dramatically following the IPO. 4 Thus, an ex post valuation of the
consideration received by the law firm may change whether one
views the arrangement as fair to the client.

" One might argue that law firms provide the same type of certification as venture capital
firms. See Miller, supra note 6, at 450 ("Venture capitalists then use these law firms as filters
to establish a client's 'trustworthiness.'"). There is no basis, however, for concluding the
magnitude of the effect-the value of the certification-is the same for law firms. Moreover,
the tize of a typical law firm investment is substantially smallcr than that of a typical venture
capital investment. McAlpine, supra note 14, at 590; see Miller, supra note 14, at 441 (noting
that a prominent firm's investment is "typically less than 1% of the total equity"). It is not
at all clear that any "certification" relationship would be linear. For example, an investment
of $20,000 might provide no certification, whereas an investment of $2 million could.
' See supra note 44.
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The ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility and the Committee on Professional andJudicial Ethics
of the New York City Bar have concluded the valuation is to be made
as of the time of the investment.4 7 Were increases in stock value
predictable as of the time of the investment, however, those expected
increases would have to be included in an ex ante assessment of the
reasonableness of the arrangement to the client.
There is, however, modest authority in a related area in favor of
the ex post approach, which would make the arrangement more
difficult to justify. In assessing the propriety of conflicts of interest
between a lawyer and his client, there is some authority that suggests
unanticipated events can give rise to ethical violations.4 8
Lastly, a law firm's investment frequently will take the form of
restricted securities, securities that cannot be freely resold without
registration under the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) or the
49
availability of an exemption from those registration requirements.

"' ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof l Responsibility, supra note 5; Ass'n of the Bar of the City
of N.Y. Comm. on Prof'l & Judicial Ethics, supra note 5 (concluding that spectacular
increases in value could be justified on the basis of riskiness of the investment); see also D.C.
Bar Legal Ethics Comm., supra note 19, at 6 n.5 (but expressly leaving open the possibility
an ex post valuation would be proper in assessing compliance with common law fiduciary
duties); Klein, supra note 5, at 336 (concluding that the valuation should be made as of the
time the interest is acquired).
' See Ethics Comm., N.H. Bar Ass'n, Formal Ethics Op. 1992/93-12 (1993), LEXIS,
Ethics Library, Ethop File ("The attorney should ask himself or herself whether, if a
disinterested lawyer were to look back at the inception of this representation once something
goes wrong, would that lawyer seriously question the wisdom of the first attorney's
requesting the client's consent to this representation or question whether there had been full
disclosure to the client prior to obtaining the consent.").
" Unless the securities had been acquired in a registered offering, they would be
restricted. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3)(i), (b) (2000) (providing that persons selling restricted
securities in compliance with that rule will not be considered "underwriters" and including
in the definition of restricted securities "[s] ecurities acquired directly or indirectly from the
issuer, or from an affiliate of the issuer, in a transaction or chain of transactions not involving
any public offering"). See generally Miller, supra note 14, at 457 (asserting that illiquidity of
restricted securities, coupled with insider trading rules, will eliminate profit potential, a view
that may have had more force under the former two-year holding period applicable to sales
under Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144, that Miller erroneously references, a period which
was shortened to one year in 1997, by Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules
144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 7390, 62 Fed. Reg. 9242, 9242 (Feb. 28, 1997)).
A client ordinarily would not undertake registering the sale, and thereby become a public
company, subject to the reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
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Other restrictions may be imposed by contract. It is customary in an
IPO for various shareholders to agree that, unless they receive the
consent of the investment bank that manages the IPO, they will not
resell the securities for some period of time following the IPO.5 °
A security's value is affected by the liquidity of the security.5 '
Although attempts to quantify the effect produce widely varying
results, the impact can be significant. For example, Bajaj et al. find
a seven percent decrease in value attributable to shares being issued
by a firm that is not public.52 They further collect estimates for
liquidity discounts prepared by others that range up to forty-five
percent or more, depending on the methodology used.53
One could argue that, in assessing the value of the property
received by the law firm, liquidity restrictions should be ignored,54
which would increase the value of property received by the law firm.
The question is one of perspective. Illiquidity adversely affects the
holder-it prevents the holder from realizing on the value of the
investment. But it does not to the same degree decrease the value of
all the rights the issuer has relinquished. By delivering securities, an
issuer delivers voting rights and rights to participate in declared

U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994 & Supp. V 1999), merely to provide unrestricted securities to
its counsel.
" CHARLESJ.JOHNSON,JR. &JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE

SECURITIESLAWS 89 (2d ed. 1997) (stating that the typical period is between ninety and 180
days).
51 Accounting Series Release No. 113, Investment Company Act Release No. 5847, 35
Fed. Reg. 19,989, 19,990 (Dec. 31, 1970) ("[S]ecurities which cannot be readily sold in the
public market place are less valuable than securities which can be sold .... ); Rockies Fund,
Initial Decisions Release No. 181, 2001 SEC LEXIS 443, at *71 (Mar. 9, 2001) (finding that
section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 1Ob-5, had been violated
by misrepresentations that securities owned were unrestricted, and stating that "except for
the most unusual situations, restricted securities and unrestricted securities have different
values"); Mates Fin. Servs., Exchange Act Release No. 8836, 1970 SEC LEXIS 375, at * 17
(Mar. 9, 1970) ("The valuation of restricted securities at the market quotations for
unrestricted securities of the same class, or at slight discounts from such quotations, is
improper except in most unusual circumstances .... ").
52 Mukesh Bajaj et al., Firm Value and Marketability Discounts 33 (Feb. 25, 2001)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taf?abstract-id
=262198.
5 Id. at 8 tbl. 1.
5 But see Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., supra note 21 (stating that liquidity
restrictions should be considered in determining whether a fee paid in the form of securities
is reasonable).
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dividends. The cost to the issuer of delivering these rights-the
diminution of existing securityholders' voting rights and rights to
participate in future dividends-is not affected by illiquidity of
securities acquired by counsel. In sum, liquidity restrictions are
"negative sum"-the cost imposed on the holder does not fully inure
to the benefit of the issuer.
The perspective provided by the ethical rules is whether an
arrangement is reasonable to the client-not whether the
arrangement is reasonable to the law firm. Because some of the cost
to an issuer of delivering securities does not depend on their liquidity,
one can plausibly argue liquidity discounts should not be applied in
valuing equity interests acquired by law firms for purposes of
compliance with ethical mandates.
This part has shown there are various difficulties a law firm will
have in meeting its burden ofproving the reasonableness of the terms
of its investment in a client. Those difficulties arise from the absence
of comparable transactions and questions concerning whether a law
firm can decrease the value it ascribes to securities it receives based
on the illiquidity of the securities. In practice, then, law firms may
have difficulty in complying with applicable ethical principles when
they make these investments.
The applicable ethical principles also may require certain
disclosure, which may either be difficult for a law firm to provide or
may be easy to overlook. Rule 1.8 requires full disclosure of the terms
of the transaction.55 It is not clear whether the taking of a fee in the
forin of the client's securities is a "business transaction with a client"
governed by Rule 1.8. The authority seems to confirm that it is.56 If
so, those investments would be subject to Rule 1.8, even when made
as part of a fee arrangement.
An examination of the financial incentives arising from a law firm's
investment in a client indicates these investments may foster divergent

5 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (1999).
56 SeeBauermeisterv. McReynolds, 571 N.W.2d 79,89 (Neb. 1997), modified, 575 N.W.2d
354 (Neb. 1998); ABA Comm, on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, supra note 5; As'n of the
Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof'l &Judicial Ethics, supra note 5; D.C. Bar Legal

Ethics Comm., supra note 19, at 4-5; Ethics Comm. of the Miss. Bar, supra note 20; Utah
State Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., supra note 21; GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W.
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.8:202 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1998); 2
MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 5, at 664.
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incentives. If so, a thorough disclosure required by Rule 1.8 could
require disclosure of these potentially conflicting interests. Part I
details those divergent incentives.

II.

ALIGNMENT OF INCENTIVES

Although law firm investments in clients have received little
attention in scholarly legal publications, one of the aspects that has
bee's addressed is die effect of diese investments on die alignment of
a law firm's interests with those of its clients. It has been argued that
leruiitting these investients may increasingly align the interests of

counsel with those of their clients.5 7
This argument is one example of the substantial literature
addressing die desirability of aligining an agent's incentives with diose
of his principal.58 Assessing the extent to which investments in clients

" Miller, Q(npra note 14, -at 449-43; Klein, niir.a note 5,at 355 ("Allowing a lawyer to hold
equity or equity, related claims on their clients may actually improve the lawyer's economic
incentives to fulfill fieil fiduciary duties."), McAlpine, suopra note 14, at 575-77. It also has
been argued these arrangements facilitate law firm provision ofnecessar-i5 non legal services,
for example, the provision of access to a network of other professionals. McAlpine,
mpra note 14, at 575; see also Miller, sopra note 14, at 451 (discussing increased monitoring
arising from lawyers who have financial interests acting as directors) Where the client has
die ability to pay in cash, the, sauie services could be provided by a law firm that billed on
an hourly basis; There is always judgment exercised in assessing whether time spent can
properly be billed to a client. By appropriately adjusting the hourly rate and the acti-ities
fuiYhch the dlicnt is billtd, duht. 6t, ices can bu provided on a c.umpu.isatcd basis widiout
requiring that the law firm receive an equity interest in its client. In the case of services
provided in the capacity as a director, that type ofserice is one that has been provided long
before these equity stakes became common.
' For example, Elson argues in favor ofpayment ofdirectors' fees in the form of restricted
tuck,
to align thc interests ofcoipuratc directurs with those ofthc owners (thu. 3hirtcholdcrs).
6
Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-ABoard-BasedSolution,34 B.C. L. REV. 937,944
(1993). Seegreraltv Michael C, Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory qfthe Finn:Managerial
Rehari, Agency Costi and Oernersip Stncture, 3J, FIN. ECON 305 (1976) (providing a seminanalysis of agency costs and the theory of the firm), Fox examines section 16 of the
7
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 8p, and argues that it reduces "the
attia-tivt.ucss of ainageinent shiac uwncislip aaid sliarc-pricc-bascd cooipcisation and
detract from thicir cffcctivc.ness as iethods ofreducing agcntcy costs?' Merritt B. Fox, Isider
TradingDeterrence Versus ManagerialIncentives:A Unified Theory ofSection 16(b), 92 MICH.L. REv.
2088,2201(1994). Curran and Schrag find a change in the law that increased the frequency
i,
i
_,Ai
selling real estate agent represented buyers wav associated with a sigiificait deIir, e
in the prices of expensive houses in one metropolitan area. Christopher Curran & Joel
Schrag, DoesIt Matter Whom an Agent Serves? EvidencefromRecent Changesin Real EstateAgen Law,
43J.L. &EcON. 265, 265 (2000). Frierman and Viswanath address the extent to which the
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properly align a law firm's incentives, however, is complex. Initially,
one has to ascertain whose interests should be promoted. Formally,
a law firm's principal is its client. 5 ' But that does not end the inquiry;
one might view the lawyer's role as requiring the interests of the
investing public also be considered. 6

use of convertible debt securities can reduce the "overinvestment" problem-undertaking
rislder projects in lieu of less risky ones with a higher cxpcctcd value, because much of the
risk is allocated to creditors, whereas much of the potential gains will accrue to
equityholder. Michael Frierman & PV. Viswanath, Agecy Problems ofDbt, Con-ertibla
Securities, and DeviationfromAbsolute Priori in Bankruptcy, 37J.L. &ECON. 455,455 (1994).
59 E.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 146 (student ed. 1986).
' Robei W. Enicibun, Rule 2(e) Revisited. SECDisciplh iug ufAttvntys Sinbe in re Cat~l, 29
AM. Bus. LJ. 155, 173 88, 243 (1991) (describing securities lawyers as a "christened
'auxiliary police force' for the SEC"); RonaldJ. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession:
A DemandSide Perspective, 49 MD. L. REv. 869, 884 (1990) ("The lawyer functions 'as a kind
of buffer between the illegitimate desires of his clients and the social interest.'" (quoting
Talcott Parsons,A SociologistLooks at theLegal Profession, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY
370, 384 (rev. ed. 195 4)); Robert W. Cordon, CorporateLaw PracticoasaPublic Calling,49 MD.
L. REv. 255, 258 (1990) ("The ideal of law as a public profession thus conceived supposes
that lawyers will develop some vision of the common good or public interest, and try to
realize it in their practices, if necessary against the immediate wishes of their clients."); Ann
Maxey, SEC EfvtocemeutActiWci Against Securities Laelyn New Runedie v. Old Pvii , 22 DE.
J. CORP. L. 537, 537-38 (1997) [hereinafter Maxey, SEC EnforcementActions] ("Lawyers are
responsible to the public even while the), owe their primary duty of loyalty to the client.");
Ann Maxey, CompetingDuties? &cuties'LayersLiabilyAfterCentral Bank, 64 FORDHAM L,
REV. 2185, 2186 (1996) [hereinafter Maxey, Competing Duties] ("In serving their unique
function, lawyers owe a primary obligation to their clients, but they also assume
responsibilities to the society that is the source of their authority."); Richard W. Painter, The
Moral Interdependence of CorporateLawyers and Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 520-35
(1994) (discussing corporate la-yers' possible duties to constituencies other than their clients),
Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1934) ("Even the
lawyer's devotion to the interests of his clients is a manifestation of a selfless loyalty to an
ideal, though it may not alv.'ays be seen in true perspective in relation to the public interest
which it is also his duty to serve."). ContraJ. Gordon Cooney, The Registration Process:The Role
of the Lawyer in Disclosure, 33 BUS. LAW. 1329, 1332-37 (rejecting the view that lawyers owe
duties to a broader constituency). See generally Barker v. Henderson, Franldin, Stames &
Holt, 797 F.2d,4190, 497 (7th Cir, 1986) ("The extent to which lawyers and accountants
should reveal their clients' wrongdoing-and to whom the), should reveal-is a question of
great moment. There are proposals to change the rules of legal ethics and the SEC's
regulations governing accountants. The professions and the regulatory agencies will debate
questions raised by cases such as this one for years to come. We express no opinion on
whether the Firms did what the), should whether there was malpractice under state law, or
whether the rules of ethics (or other fiduciary doctrines) ought to require lawyers and
accountants to blow the whistle in equivalent circumstances, We are satisfied, however, that
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As noted above, 6' effective securities markets depend on the proper
functioning of various independent professionals. Although formally
a law firm's principal is the client, because the proper functioning of
the securities markets depends on the proper performance by lawyers
of their duties, the investing public is at least an interested party in an
evaluation of the propriety of the law firm's conduct in a public
offering.
In some circumstances, it may be (or appear to be) profitable for
the individuals managing a company to have the firm engage in
securities fraud. One role of a corporate law firm is to require
disclosure in securities offerings of information that may adversely
affect the value of its client's securities.6 2 A review of applicable
federal securities laws indicates law firm investments in clients can
create financial incentives for the respective law firms to suppress

an award of damages under the securities laws is not the way to blaze the trail toward
improved ethical standard, in the legal and accounting professions. Liability depends on an
P)ri;ting diuty to disclose. The securities law therefore must lag behind changes in ethical and
fiduciary standards. The plaintiffs have not pointed to any rule impo3ing on cither Firm a
duty to blow the whistle."); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were theLazyers?A BehuvioralInquiny
into Lawyers' Responsibilityfor Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 78 (1993) ("On one hand
(and to an accelerating degree) the profession and the law demand loyalty to clients and
respect for even their dark confidences. At the same time, an attorney's loyalty is subject to
the overriding general norm in both ethics and law, that lawyers must not knowingly give
substantial assistance to client fraud, This Article considers the possibility that this general
norm has been undermined sufficiently that, at least implicitly, loyalty emerges as the domin
ant justification, thus providing a basis for lawyers to rationalize continued involvement.");
Arnold W. Messer, Role and Roasonable Expectotions of th Undwriter,Lawyer and Indepcndcnt
Securities Auditor in theEfficient Provision of Verified Infornation: "Truth in Securities" Reinforced, 52
NEB. L. REV. 429, 446-58 (1973) (discussing whether a lawyer should have a duty to investors); Marshall L. Small, An Attorrc'sResponsibilities Under Federaland State Securities Laws:
Private Counseloror Public Servant?, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1208, 1213-28 (1973) (noting the
tension between a law-yer's obligation to require disclosure of material, negative information
and the financial interest of his client and discussing a law firm's liability to the investing
public); Stone, supra, at 7 ("Steadily the best skill and capacity of the profession has been
dra.sn into the ccacting and highly specialized service of business and finance. At its best
the changed system has brought to the command of the business world loyalty and a superb
proficiency and technical skill. At its worst it has made the learned profession of an earlier
day the obsequious servant of business, and tainted it with the morals and manners of the
market place in its most anti-social manifestations.").
See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
1'2SeegeneraUy Cooney, supra note 60, at 1330, 1335-37 (describing the process).
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disclosure of certain material, negative information." Where the
financial incentives of a law firm conflict with the fulfillment of its
professional obligations, it can be ineffectual to rely on professionalism of lawyers to cause lawyers to disregard their financial incentives and fulfill expectations of the investing public."4 The details of
those incentives follow.
A. Issuers' Liability
Federal securities laws impose incentives on an issuer to be truthful
in describing its financial position. Section 11 of the 1933 Act (section
11) imposes liability on an issuer that sells securities in an IPO
registered by a registration statement that contains a false or
misleading prospectus."5 The liability is "strict"-the issuer does not

" Klein addresses incentives arising in the representation of a takeover target. Klein, supra
note 5, at 355-56. He notes that an investment in a client can diminish the incentive to
derail the acquisition in order to continue receipt of legal fees. Id. Klein, who does not
detail the source of divergent incentives discussed below, see infra pp. 399-407, notes the
incentives may be misaligned, but dismisses the impact of any misalignment, stating, "[TI hey
do not appear to be any more significant than they are in the contingent fee setting." Klein,
supra note 5, at 352-53. Seegeneraly Maxey, CompetingDuties, supra note 60, at 2228-29 ("A
disclosure duty does not necessarily serve the interests of the public. The integrity of the
securities issuance process may be undermined by lawyers who abandon their clients at the
first hint of trouble. Lawyers who desert too quickly their misguided but honest clients may
harm the public's interests. Most clients want to comply with disclosure laws, but want to do
so in a way that does not harm perceived interests of the issuer-e.g., disclosure of
information useful to competitors; premature release of information that will cause the stock
price to rise or fall; and premature release of news that hurts employee morale.... Clients
also have a legitimate interest in obtaining a second opinion in difficultjudgment situations.
Lawyers should not be required to protect themselves from liability by abandoning too
quickly a client that appears to be acting in good faith.").
4 See Prentice, supra note 7, at 1604-53 (collecting empirical evidence of a self-serving bias
from numerous studies in various contexts). But see Steinberg, supra note 7, at 708 ("At times,
counsel may be pushed by her clients to short-circuit due diligence or to draft less than full
disclosure documents. The presence of counsel to withstand this pressure is a matter that
business attorneys must face with some frequency. Yet the fabric of the American capitalist
system is interwoven with the lawyer's professionalism to stand firm when so confronted."
(footnotes omitted)).
r' 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994). In particular, that section creates a cause of action against
an issuer, where the registration statement "contained an untrue statement of a material fact
or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading." Id.
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have a due diligence defense.6 6 False or misleading offering
documents could also result in an issuer's liability under Rule 1Ob-5
(Rule 1Ob-5),6 7 liability under which requires proof of scienter.6 8 The
statute of limitations requires that a lawsuit asserting violation of
section 11 be brought within three years of the offering date.69 A
similar statute of limitations applies to private actions under Rule
lOb-5. 7 ° The length of these statutes of limitations gives rise to
incentives that vary between an issuer and investors.
The contours of this liability remove most of the possible financial
return to an issuer itself for engaging in fraud in the offering of
securities. Substantial remedies are available to purchasers. The
remedies are imperfect, as is frequently the case with legal remedies.
Fraud that goes undetected for more than three years, which one
would suppose not to be common, may be profitable. Problems of
proof may prevent an otherwise meritorious lawsuit from succeeding.
And the computation of damages may be imperfect to remove all
incentive for an issuer to engage in fraud in the offering of securities.
Damages under section 11, for example, for one who purchases in
the offering and holds the securities equal the difference between the
purchase price and the value at the time the lawsuit was commenced,
less the amount proved by the defendant to be attributable to factors
other than the registration statement being misleading. 7' Consider an
offering at $10 per share. Assume the registration statement includes
a material misstatement, and, if the truth had been revealed, the
offering price would have been $9 per share. By the time the lawsuit
is filed, the market as a whole has increased by eleven percent. So,
the stock is trading at $10, representing an eleven percent increase
over the actual value of the stock at the time of the offering. No
damages can be recovered under section 11.
But the relationship is asymmetric, as the issuer need not pay
damages attributable to market declines. This asymmetry allows for

" See id. § 77k(b) (excluding the issuer from those persons who can assert a due diligence
defense under paragraph (b)).
67 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2000).

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 77m (Supp. V 1999). The statute of limitations may terminate earlier,
depending on the date the violation should have been discovered. Id.
7 Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991).
7, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e).
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an incentive, albeit modest, before considering
litigation costs, not to
72

disclose fully all material information.

Computation of damages under Rule 1Ob-5 is more complex. 73 As
liability under that rule requires proof of scienter, however, that rule

also will not prevent fraud in securities offerings from having a
positive expected value (before considering litigation costs).
Together, section 11 and Rule 1Ob-5 eliminate much of the
incentive that would otherwise exist for an issuer to be less than fully
candid in IPO disclosure. The remedies are not perfect. Nevertheless, when one also considers the cost of litigation, these provisions
would seem essentially to eliminate the value to the issuer of
providing less-than-complete disclosure in an IPO. The same cannot
be said, however, for those who have invested in the issuer.

B. Law Firm Liability
Neither section 11 nor Rule 1Ob-5 generally allows one who has a
viable cause of action to pierce the corporate veil. There are some
exceptions. Most notably, a person who controls an issuer is also
liable for a violation by the issuer of section 11 or Rule 1Ob-5, subject
to certain defenses. 74 But, in general, the loss imposed on a
One commentator, however, suggests that, in some circumstances, aggregate per share
damages in a class action lawsuit could exceed the difference between the offering price and
the price at the time a class action lawsuit is commenced. Paul Grier, A Methodologyfor the
Calculationof Section 11 Damages, 5 STANFORDJ.L. Bus. &FIN. 99, 119 (1999). That result
requires that the security value at some time between the offer date and the date the lawsuit
is filed is less than the value at the time the lawsuit is filed. Id. This circumstance may
partially mitigate the consequences of the asymmetry discussed in the text.
" See, e.g., Lcwis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Compensator, Damages in Rule lob-5
Actions: PragmaticJusticeor Chaos?, 30 SETON HALL L. RiV. 1083, 1083-84 (2000) ("Damage
awards in private actions under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193 4... and
Securities and Exchange Commission... Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder may be either
an area where flexibility, pragmatism, and justice prevail or 'a confused area of the law
where the courts, forced to rely on their own wits, have created a myriad of approaches.'
Or perhaps both descriptions are accurate and together render a more complete description
of the state of the law of compensatory damages under Rule 10b-5. The reader will have
to judge for himself. In any event, there is no clear rule guiding the measure of damages
under Rule 10b-5 and hence little predictability for counsel or the client." (footnotes
omitted)).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o, 78t(a) (1994). Seegeneraly Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg,
Controlling Person Liabiliy Under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exclange Act and Section 15 of the
SecuritiesAct, 53 Bus. LAW. 1, 1 (1997) (discussing control person liability and stating, "After
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in CentralBank ofDenver,N.A. v. FirstInterstateBank ofDenver,
12
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shareholder for a disclosure violation arises from the decrease in the
value of his interest in the issuer. If a holder of securities at the time
of a disclosure violation sells those securities before the disclosure
violation becomes public, it is very unlikely the securityholder will
ever bear the cost of the violation.
A law firm having an equity investment in its client has a different
time horizon from its client. Some information, if not disclosed in
offering documents, will become public shortly thereafter, e.g., at the
end of the current fiscal quarter. As to that information, the
incentives created by an investment in a client are aligned with those
of the client. But as to information that would become public, absent
disclosure in the offering documents, within three years of the offering
but after any transfer limitations on the securities in the hands of a
law firm would expire,75 an investment by a law firm creates
incentives different from those of the principal. The law firm would
have an incentive, not shared by the issuer, to postpone disclosure
and sell the securities in the market as soon as possible.
This strategy for a law firm is not entirely riskless. There is a
theoretical possibility that a law firm would be held responsible for
inadequate disclosure in offering documents it participated in
preparing.76 A law firm cannot be liable under section 11, other than
for portions of the prospectus included on the authority of the law

NA.,... it is reasonable to expect more emphasis on private actions involving control person
liability within federal law and similar state law."). A defense is available to the controlling
person, which varies between the two statutes. The control person is not liable under section
11 if he had no reason to know of the violation. 15 U.S.C. § 77o. The control person has
no liability under Rule lob-5 if he acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly
induce the violation. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).
A law firm's mere "ability to influence" a primary violator's conduct has been held
insufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute control. Wenneman v. Brown, 49 F. Supp. 2d
1283, 1290 (D. Utah 1999). Cox, however, asserts, "Even lawyers, with sufficient
involvement, can be control persons of their client corporation and its officers." James D.
Cox,JustDesertsforAccountants andAttorneysAfter Bank of Denver, 38 ARIZ. L REV. 519, 534
n.80 (1996).
5 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
SSeegeneraly Richard W. Painter &Jennifer E. Duggan, LawyerDisclosureof CorporateFraud:
Establishinga Fim Foundation, 50 SMIU L. REV. 225, 239 (1996) (stating that only a small
percentage of the law firms practicing in the securities area have been named as defendants
in "high profile" securities litigation).
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firm as an expert.7 7 That is usually limited to the description of the
validity of the securities issued78 and any description of the tax
consequences of acquiring the security or certain other unusual
descriptions of legal matters, e.g., descriptions of certain applicable
regulations.7 9 A law firm also normally would not be liable under
section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933,80 as it would not normally be
one who "offered" or "sold" securities. 8'
A law firm might conceivably be liable to purchasers under Rule
1Ob-5. There is some empirical evidence sketching the scope of attor-

77 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994) (not listing law firms as liable parties, other than as
experts); see generally Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 n.22 (1983)
("Moreover, certain individuals who play a part in preparing the registration statement
generally cannot be reached by a Section 11 action. These include corporate officers other
than those specified in 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a), lawyers not acting as 'experts,' and accountants
with respect to parts of a registration statement which they are not named as having
prepared or certified."); Kitchens v. United States Shelter, No. 82-1951-1, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18,546, at *116 (D.S.C.June 30, 1988); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 643,683 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("To say that the entire registration statement is expertised
because some lawyer prepared it would be an unreasonable construction of the statute.").
-An indi,.idual lawyer who represented the issuer and who also was a director of the issuer,
however, could be liable under section 11 arising from his capacity as a director. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(a).
78 See 9 Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4260 n.160
(3d ed.
1992) (stating that an opinion sometimes addresses "a variety of other questions, like validity
of a title or a patent");James H. Cheek, III, CounselNamed in a Prospectus, 6 REV. SEC. REG.
939, 942-43 (1973) ("Mt is likely that a court would hold counsel to be an 'expert' in the
Section 11 sense with respect to his conclusions and statements as to the legality of the
securities being sold, and as to such matters as tax consequences or patent validity."); Painter
& Duggan, supra note 76, at 24.2 (identifying due incorporation5 corporate authority, and tax
consequences as matters typically addressed in legal opinions included or referenced in
registration statements); Small, supra note 60, at 1192-93 (arguing that a lawyer is an expert
for purposes of the validity of securities offered). But see Messer, supra note 60, at 455 ("The
lawyer is not an 'expert' for section 11 liability purposes."). Maxey notes that liability risk
on the legality opinion is small. Maxey, Competing Duties, supra note 60, at 2188 n.9.
" See Painter & Duggan, supra note 76, at 242 (identifying due incorporation, corporate
authority, and tai consequences as matters typically addressed in legal opinions included of
referenced in registration statements).
80 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (Supp. V 1999).
"' Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 651 (1988) (stating, as to lawyers and accountants
providing normal professional services in an offering, "The buyer does not, in any
meaningful sense, 'purchas[e] the security from' such a person."); Wilson.v. Saintine
Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (2d Cir. 1989); Painter & Duggan,
supra note 76, at 243.
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ney liability, which suggests only a modest potential liability.8 2 That
data, moreover, predates relevant changes in federal law favorable to
law firms representing issuers.8 3 The Supreme Court held in 1994
that there is no private cause of action available under Rule 1Ob-5
against one who merely "aids and abets" a violation of that rule by
another.84 Based on that opinion, it has been held there is no cause
of action against someone for conspiring to violate Rule 1Ob-5.85

8-

Marino and Marino developed statistics bearing on law firm liability. Steven P. Marino

& Renee D. Marino, An Empirical Study of Recent Securities Class Action Settlements Invoig
Accountants, Attorneys, or Underwriters, 22 SEC. REG. LJ. 115 (1994). They find that attorneys
made payments in settlements of securities class actions with slightly more than one-halfthe
corresponding frequency for accountants and less than half the corresponding frequency for
underwriters. Id. at 159. The average contribution of the lawyers was sixteen percent of the
settlements, or $1.06 million. Id. at 162 & tbl.13. Only a small portion of the law firms
(thirteen percent) were large firms (one of the 250 largest firms). Id.
These numbers appear to overstate the relative frequency with which a law firm will
settle, relative to accountants and underwriters, in a traditional offering. The reason is as
follows: Sixty. nine percent of the offerings in their sample invohing lawyer defendants were
bond offerings or limited partnerships. Id. at 160. Both types of offerings frequently will
involve special tax opinions. Id. In the same sample, only twenty-two percent of the lawsuits
in which accountants and underwriters were defendants involved bond offerings or limited
partnership investments. Id.
Representation ofgovernment-insured financial institutions, however, presents unique,
and potentially substantial, risks. Sea infta note 91 and accompanying text.
8 Marino and Marino's data is not directly relevant to current securities practice, as the
sample period ended in February of 1994, Marino & Marino, supra note 82, at 121, the year
the Supreme Court held there is no private cause of action for aiding and abetting a
violation of Rule 1Ob. 5 and before the adoption of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, which, inter alia, limited discovery, provided
a 3afe harbor for certain forward looking statements (not including statements in IPOs), and
limited the application ofjoint and several liability. See generaly William S. Lerach, "The
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995-27 Months Later": Securities ClassAction Litigation
Under the PrivateSecurities Litigation Roform Act's Brave New World, 76 WASH. U. LQ. 597 (1998)
(discussing the implications of the Act).
4 Cent. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
Dinsmore v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, 135 F.3d 837, 841, 843
(2d Cir. 1998) ("[E]very court to have addressed the viability of a conspiracy cause of action
under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in the wake of Central Bank has agreed that Central Bank
precludes such a cause of action."). Contra Wenneman v. Brown, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1283,
1289-90 (). Utah 1999) (holding actionable allegations that the defendant law firm
"knowingly engaging in a conspiracy the object of which was to mislead ... investors"). See
genrally Mary M, Wynne, Comment, Prima , Liabili4-Amongst Secondagy Actors. 4hy the Second
Circuit's"BrightLine" StandardShould Prevail,44 ST. LOUisU. LJ. 1607,1611 (2000) (discussing

Dinsmore v. Squadron, Ellenoff.
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However, a law firm might, in a particular case, be considered a
86
primary violator.
Certainly, there could be liability where members of a law firm,
possessing the requisite mental state, directly communicate to
prospective investors false or misleading statements. 87 A victim

86 Central Bank spawned a wealth of law review commentary.

See, e.g., Douglas M.

Branson, Chasing the Rogue ProfessionalAfter the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 50
SMU L. REV. 91, 110-15 (1996) (discussing primary liability after CentralBank); Cox, supra
note 74 (discussing the implications of Central Bank); Donald C. Langevoort, Wordsfrnm on
High About Rule lOb-5: Chiarella's Histoy, Central Bank's Future, 20 DEL.J. CORP. L. 865,
885-96 (1995); Melissa Harrison, The Assault on the Liability of Outside Professionals:AreLauyers
andAccountants offthe Hook?, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 473,498-513 (1997); Lewis D. Lowenfels &
Alan R. Bromberg, LiabilitiesofLauyers andAccountants UnderRule 10b-5, 53 Bus. LAW. 1157,
1167-80 (1998);Jill E. Fisch, The Scope ofPrivate SecuitiesLitigation InSearchofLiability Standards
for Seconday Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1300-03 (1999); Maxey, CompetingDuties,
supra note 60 (discussing the consequences of CentralBank); Robert A. Prentice, Locating That
"Indistinct" and "Virtually Nonexistent" Line Between Primat and Secondary Liability Under Section
10(b), 75 N.C. L REV. 691, 717-59 (1997); Steinberg, supra note 7, at 713-14 (stating that
some authority exists for holding that drafting fraudulent disclosure is a primary violation);
Richard H. Walker & David M. Levine, The Limits of Central Bank's Textualist ApproachAttempts to Overdraw the Bank Prove Unsuccessful, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1997); AmandaJ.
Aymond, Comment, You'd Better Watch What Thg Say: An Examination of Primay Liabilityfor
SecondayActors Under Section 10(b), 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 835 (2000); Patricia Blanchini, Note,
The Statement Someone Else Makes May Be Your Own." Prirnay Liabiliy Under Section 10(b) After
Central Bank, 71 ST.JOHN'SL. REV. 767 (1997); RodneyD. Chrisman, Note, "BrightLine,"
"SubstantialParticipatin" or Something Else: Who Is a Primay Violator Under Rule lOb 5?, 89 KY.
LJ. 201 (2000); Carrie E. Goodwin, Note, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank: Not Just the
End ofAiding andAbetting Under Section 10(b), 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1387 (1995); Barry D.
Hunter, Liability of Issuer's Counsel in the Wake of Central Bank of Denver-to Whom Is the
Lawyer's Due DiligenceDue?, 86 KY. LJ. 413 (1997);John Kalmbach, Note, Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver: Retrindkng EstablishedSection 10(b) Doctrines, 55 LA.
L. REV. 1009 (1995); Ameena Y. Majid, Comment, Diminishingthe Expected Impact of Central
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver: Secondary Liability Masqueradingas Prima,
Liability Under Section 10(b), 28 LOY. U. CHI. LJ. 551 (1997); Ben D. Orlanski, Comment,
Whose RepresentationsAre TheseAnyway? Attorney ProspectusLiabiliyAfter Central Bank, 42 UCLA
L. REV. 885 (1995); Glenn Wallace Roberts II, Note, 10(b) or Not 10(b): Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1239 (1995); Glen Shu,
Comment, Te a Second Look, Central Bank After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, 33 Hous. L. REV. 539 (1996).
87 Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263, 267-68 (6th Cir. 1998); see also
United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854,863 (2d Cir. 1964) (affirming criminal conviction
of lawyer who, inter alia, made deceptive statements and sought to obfuscate the fraudulent
scheme in a discussion with a victim by stating "he was acting as a 'trustee' for some of the
principals and, when [the victim] sought elucidation, explained that 'as a trustee and as an
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alternatively might attempt to characterize a law firm's participation
in drafting false or misleading disclosure documents as constituting a
primary violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
in a subsequently vacated opinion, opined:
[W]e hold that a lawyer who can fairly be characterized as an author
or a co-author of a client's fraudulent document may be held primarily
liable to a third-party investor under the federal securities laws for the
material misstatements or omissions contained in the document, even
when the lawyer did not sign or endorse the document and the investor is
therefore unaware of the lawyer's role in the fraud.
We later set forth the following specific requirements to hold such a
lawyer liable: (1) the lawyer knows (or is reckless in not knowing) that the
statement will be relied upon by investors, (2) the lawyer is aware (or is
reckless in not being aware) of the material misstatement or omission, (3)
the lawyer played such a substantial role in the creation of the statement
that the lawyer could fairly be said to be the "author" or "co-author" of
the statement, and (4) the other requirements of primary liability are
satisfied.'

Although this opinion was vacated, there remains other authority
supporting categorizing law firm acts in drafting offering documents
as primary violations.8 9

attorney * * * licensed in the State of New York, *** he was not obligated to reveal any of
the sources and it is enough for anyone to accept a legal document from a trustee who was
an attorney and the trustee was not required to reveal the source of the legal document or
who the principals were behind the legal document'-urcly a novel contribution to the law
of trusts").
12,
1998),
97-1261
(3d Cir. Feb.
' Klein v. Boyd, Nos. 97-1143,
http://vls.law.vill.edu/locator/3d/Feb 1998/98a1795p.txt, vaated on grant of reh'g en bane,
Nos. 97-1143, 97-1261, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4121 (Mar. 9, 1998).
" RelevantauthorityincludesBreardv. Sactnoff& Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991)
(finding, in an opinion that does not reference aiding or abetting, that allegations of fraud
were adequately pled against a law firm that drafted an offering memorandum in a case
decided before CentralBan,);Afolecular Technology Corp. v. Vz/entine, 925 F.2d 910, 913 11,
917-19 (6th Cir. 1991) (affirming, in a case decided before CentralBank,ajury verdict against
a lawyer for violation of Rule 10b,5, apparently on a primary basis5 for failure to include
material information in editorial comments made on an offering circular); l14"nne-nan v. Browm,
49 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1289 (D. Utah 1999) (relying on participation in preparation of
allegedly misleading offering materials, in addition to more serious malfeasance, in failing
a lawsuit agaifuit legal couiisel); Em,,plfiys Insuianme v. Alusick, P&t,; & Gurrett, 871
to dis
F. Supp. 381,388-89 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (denying dismissal of a claim against counsel alleging
violation of Rule 1Ob-5 arising from participation in the drafting of an allegedly misleading
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Two additional avenues of liability exist. There is potential liability

in this context in a civil action brought by the SEC, which can bring
a lawsuit against one who "knowingly provides substantial assistance"
to a violator.9" Lastly, a law firm could find itself in the unenviable
position of being sued by a receiver appointed to run the law firm's
malpractice in preparing allegedly
former client, for alleged
91
inadequate disclosure.
Thus, there is some financial risk to a law firm for its participation
in drafting a misleading offering document. The availability of
private theories against a law firm are, however, subject to some
doubt and require proof of scienter. The likelihood of a successful
lawsuit against a law firm is therefore lower than the corresponding
likelihood for the issuer, which is subject to strict liability under
section 11. An investment by a law firm in a client it is taking public
therefore provides some incentive for the law firm to be more
aggressive in limiting prospectus disclosure than is in the interest of
the issuer itself.
Addressing the relative probabilities that an issuer and a lawyer will
be sued does not, however, fully address the extent to which

disclosure document), corrected and reconsiderationgranted in part, 948 F. Supp. 942 (S.D. Cal.
1995); Atlantis Group, Inc. v.Rospatch Corp. (In re Rospatch Sec. Litig.), [1992 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 96,939 (W.D. Mich. July 8, 1992). Cf Wilson v. Great Am.
Indus., Inc., 855 F.2d 987, 990, 995 (2d Cir. 1988) (reversingjudgment for the defendants,
including, among others, a lawyer who also was a director and Secretary of the issuer, in a
bench trial concerning alleged violation of Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9). ContraAbell
v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1124-25 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding underwriters' counsel
not liable for misleading offering materials; limiting liability to misleading opinion letters),
vacatedsub non Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989); Ames v. Uranus, Inc., No. 92-2170-JWL,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12,639, at *25-30 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 1994) (granting summary
judgment in favor of a law firm, not mentioned in a disclosure document, where the law firm
provided commenta on the disclosure without performing due diligence), reconsiderationdenied,
No. 92-2170-JWL, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15,956 (D. Kan. Oct. 21, 1994).
7
" 15 U.S.C. § 8t(e) (Supp. V 1999). See generaly SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457
F. Supp. 682,713-15 (D.D.C. 1978) (finding aiding-and-abetting liability in connection with
inadequate steps to disclose adverse financial information at the closing of a merger).
"' See FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992) (reversing a grant of
summaryjudgment in favor of a law firm on claims, brought by the receiver of the client, of
malpractice in the drafting ofoffering materials), rev'd, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), on remand, 61 F.3d
17 (adopting the same conclusion reached in FDIC v. O'Melveny &Myers, 969 F.2d 744 (9th
Cir. 1992)); cf.,
e.g., Dennis E; Curtis, Old Knights and N, Ciconpions. Kaye Scholer, the Offce of
Thrifi Supervision, and the Pursuit of t/e Dollar, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 985 (1993) (discussing a
prominent case of a law firm pursued by a regulator of the firm's client).
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investments affect the alignment of the interests of a law firm and its
client. The relative magnitudes of the possible losses and possible
gains also are important. A very small investment by a law firm
might give rise to no incentive to prepare aggressive (incomplete)
disclosure, because the possible loss in litigation, even if remote, might
dwarf any possible return on the investment.
For another reason, a law firm's financial interest in its client may
not produce aggregate incentives that make it in a law firm's interest
to disclose less information than is in the best interest of the client to
disclose.9 2 A law firm may assign value to its reputation for providing
professional, i.e., independent, services."
A law firm with a
reputation for exercising its professional obligations independently
may provide a value to a client by providing increased certification of
the accuracy of the client's disclosure.' That reputation may increase

'" The client's managers also may desire to withhold information whose disclosure is in
the best interests of the client itself. That may be the product of an incorrect assessment of
the likelihood of various outcomes or internal agency problems (a divergence in the
incentives of the issuer and its managers). In that case, a law firm may reluctantly participate
in preparation of a disclosure document the law firm believes to be inadequate, in order to
maintain an ongoing client relationship. See generally Prentice, supra note 7, at 1644-49
(collecting various empirical studies supporting the principle that a desire to maintain a client
relationship affects how accounting firms resolve accounting issues in audits).
Painter & Duggan, supra note 76, at 239-40 (asserting that law firms are more sensitive
to allegations of misconduct than are accounting firms). But cf.Langevoort, supra note 60,
at 112 ("A firm charged with going too far in the representation of a client may find other
and prospective clients unbothered, perhaps even pleased."). &generaly Larry E. Ribstcif,
Ethical Rules, Ageni , Costs, and Law Firn Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1711-20 (1998)
(discussing the relationship between law firm structure and reputational bonding).
:, Black, supra note 12, at 787; RonaldJ. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lauyers: Legal
Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE LJ. 239, 288-91 (1984) (addressing acquisitions of
businesses); RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms ofMarket Effciency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 621 n. 197 (1984) ("The certification function of lawyers, accountants and
engineers, while real.., is substantially more limited [than that of underwriters] ."); Maxey,
Competing Duties, supra note 60, at 2218 (addressing securities offerings); Karl S. Okamoto,
Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15, 18 ("[S]ervice as a reputational
intermediary is a defining aspect of lawyers' work."); Painter & Duggan, supranote 76, at 258
n.200; Prentice, supra note 86, at 743-44; cf. Diana R. Franz et al., The Impact of Litigation
Against an Audit Finm on the larket Value of NanlitgatingClients, 13J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN.
117, 117 (1998) (finding "clients not involved in the litigation [alleging audit failure]
experience significant negative returns at the announcement of litigation against their audit
firm").
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the marketability of the law firm, thereby increasing its revenue.9 5
The prospect of other sanctions from the SEC also may cause a law
firm not to produce misleading disclosure. The SEC can institute
proceedings under Rule 102(e) to suspend a lawyer who has engaged
in "unethical" or "improper" professional conduct from practice
before the agency." This avenue, however, has only infrequently
been the basis of lawyer discipline,97 and the SEC ordinarily will not
initiate a proceeding under this rule unless there has been a prior
criminal conviction or a prior issuance of an injunction in a civil
proceeding finding a violation of securities law.98 Alternatively, the
against a lawyer, if he were
SEC could enter a cease-and-desist order
99
found to be the "cause" of a violation.

" Okamoto, supra note 94, at 24 (stating that professionals with greater reputations can
command higher fees for the lending of their reputations).
96 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1)(ii) (2000); Painter & Duggan, supra note 76, at 227. See
generally Emerson, supra note 60, at 173-88 (providing detailed statistics concerning the use
of the procedure, which was formerly set forth at 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1990), and indicating
that a thorough search uncovered only 139 reported cases); Maxey, SEC EnforcementActions,
supra note 60, at 547-64 (discussing the application of the rule). Lawyer culpability under
this theory appears to require scienter, although the contours of this liability are not entirely
clear. ComparePainter & Duggan, supra note 76, at 244-55 (citing In re Carter, Exchange Act
Release No. 17,597, 1981 SEC LEXIS 1940 (Feb. 28, 1981), and Checkosky v. SEC, 23
F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and stating, "Thirteen years earlier, the Commission had issued
its release in Carter &Johnson, stating that attorneys 'could not be sanctioned under Rule
2(e)(1)(iii) for willfully aiding and abetting [a client's securities law] violations unless they
"were aware or knew that their role was part of an activity that was improper or illegal .... "' " (quoting Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d at 484)), with In re Checkosky, Exchange
Act Release No. 38,183, 1997 SEC LEXIS 137, at *37 n.50 (Jan. 21, 1997) ("Respondents
make certain arguments based on the recognized inherent powers of an administrative
agency to discipline attorneys and the mental state required for such action. However, while
we have such inherent powers, we do not agree with Respondents' arguments that those
powers mandate a bad faith finding.").
97 Emerson, supra note 60, at 178 (noting that the SEC had disbarred or suspended 141
lawyers over fifty years).
9 Phyllis Diamond, WalkerSees SEC ContinuingRestraintin ChargingLawyersoverllegalConduct,
31 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1067 (Aug. 13, 1999).
99 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h- l(a), 78u-3(a) (1994); In re Candie's, Securities Act Release No. 7263,
1996 SEC LEXIS 654, at * 13 (Feb. 21, 1996) (accepting offer of settlement concerning a law
firm's participation in scheme to evade provisions of Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901.905); In re Goodman, Securities Act Release No. 7248, 1995 SEC LEXIS 3610, at *4-8
(Dec. 14, 1995) (concerning false statements in offering circulars); In re Schaeffer, Exchange
Act Release No. 36,052, 1995 SEC LEXIS 1971, at *17-18 (accepting offer of settlement
from lawyers who signed a misleading Form 10-K); In re Fillmore, Exchange Act Release No.
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C. Summary
Part I has discussed the contours of the ethical restrictions on law
firms investing in their clients. Part II has addressed the extent to
which these investments can create divergent incentives. The
incentives that exist are complex and have conflicting influences.
Definitive conclusions cannot be reached merely by reliance on a
theoretical analysis. An empirical analysis is required.

III. THE IPO PROCESS AND LAWYERS' ROLES
The process by which securities are brought to market in an IPO
presents a context in which one can make an empirical assessment of
the relationship between law firm investments and performance of
professional obligations. This Part reviews the mechanics of that
process relevant to understanding the empirical tests.
An issuer that determines to go public must first assemble a team
of professionals. It will select an accounting firm to perform the
required audit and legal counsel to guide it through various regulatory hurdles. The legal counsel may be one that has represented the
firm in corporate and other matters for some time, or it may be first
hired by the issuer for the IPO.
The issuer will then select an investment bank to manage the
offering. The competition in which the investment bank is selected
is sometimes called a "beauty pageant."' 00 In the beauty pageant, the
issuer will interview investment banks and select the one making the
most attractive presentation. During the beauty pageant, the
investment banks will discuss with the issuer the prices they believe
the company ultimately could realize in its IPO. Issuers consider the

36,259, 1995 SEC LEXIS 2471, at *7-9 (Sept. 21, 1995) (accepting a settlement arising
from a lawyer's improper distribution of funds from a trust account, which funds were
required to be used to effect an acquisition); In re Feldman, Securities Act Release No. 7014,
1993 SEC LEXIS 2401, at *10-12 (Sept. 20, 1993) (Commission finding a violation had
been "aided and abetted and caused" by the provision of inaccurate legal advice that certain

securities need not be registered); Painter & Duggan, supra note 76, at 227, 232-33
(addressing whether lawyers could be considered to be the cause of a violation).
"" See, e.g., Avital Louria Hahn, Investment Banks Continue Hunt for Telecom Research,
INVESTMENT DEALERS DIG.,Jan. 10, 2000, at 10 (using the term in that context).
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various price estimates, in addition to other factors, in selecting an
investment bank to manage the IPO. 0 '
Any price that is discussed at that time is only an estimate. 1The
2
actual price is not set until immediately before the IPO begins'
ordinarily a few months following the conclusion of the beauty
pageant,0 3 absent changes in market conditions. In the intervening
period, a preliminary prospectus is prepared. SEC rules require that
a preliminary prospectus used for marketing before the IPO begins
disclose an estimate of the IPO price.'0 4 The price estimate first
disclosed in a preliminary prospectus, which is frequently stated in the
form of a range, is the best publicly available evidence of the estimate
expressed by the managing underwriter in the beauty pageant-prior
to any due diligence.
The lawyers and the investment bank will perform due diligence
after the beauty pageant and before the IPO is actually priced.0 5
Compliance with the provisions of section 11 described above"0 6
requires material negative information discovered during these
procedures be disclosed in the prospectus. The investment bank will
tour plants, where the bank believes doing so to be necessary.0 7 It
may seek to find relevant information from customers or suppliers. 108

101 Abby M. Alderman & Kenneth Y. Hao, The Initial Public Offering Process, in How TO

PREPARE AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 1995, at 405, 411 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. B-904, 1995); WilliamJ. Grant,Jr., Overview ofthe Underwriting
Process, in SECURITIES UNDERWRITING: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 25, 26-27 (KennethJ.
Bialkin & WilliamJ. Grant,Jr. eds., 1985).
12 Laird H. Simons, III, Considerationsin Selecting the ManagingUndenwriter(s)foranInitial Public
Offering, in HoW TO PREPARE AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 1993, at 27,45 (PI] Corporate
Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-817, 1993).
" John K. Hoyns, Sample Time andResponsibility Schedulefor an InitialPublic Offering of Common
Stock, in HOW TO PREPARE AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 1993, supra note 102, at 51, 55
(stating that the managing underwriter is selected within several months before the
commencement of the preparation of the registration statement).
104 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.501(a)(8)(i), 229.501(b)(3) instructions (2000).
105 CfJOHNSON &McLAUGHLIN, supranote 50, at 283 ("Immediately after the investment
banking firm decides to proceed vth a financing, its counsel will usually send the issuer a
letter requesting basic documents regarding the issuer.").
'0' See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
107 JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 50, at 292.
" Inre Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 789 F. Supp. 1489,1497-98 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(discussing the diligence contacts ith various customers), affd inpartand ro'dinpart,50 F.3d
615, 622 (9th Cir. 1994).
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The due diligence activities of the lawyers (both the issuer's counsel
and the underwriters' counsel) include both discussions with key
personnel and, in addition, a review of documents. They will assess
the existence of risks arising from contractual relationships. The
nature and extent of the lawyers' diligence is determined by the law
firms themselves, based on the particular issuer. It will generally
include, for example, the review of the issuer's board minutes and the
issuer's material contracts.0 9 The purpose is to identify negative
information that needs to be disclosed-information that, if not
disclosed, would make the IPO prospectus misleading. Illustrative
items are cross-defaults (contractual arrangements that make a default
under one contract a default under a second contract-a second
contract that may be with entirely different parties), negative pledge
agreements (in which the issuer agrees not to grant security interests
to third parties) and transactions with affiliated parties." 0
A law firm exercises discretion in deciding what information has to
be disclosed to the public. There are certain items SEC rules
expressly require be disclosed."' But, in addition, SEC rules provide
that all material information has to be disclosed in a prospectus, even
if there is no express requirement calling for disclosure of the
particular item in question."' 2
Assessing the materiality of
information is a matter ofjudgment. "3 A law firm participating in an
IPO thus has to exercise judgment in deciding the scope of its
diligence investigation, in determining what information has to be

JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 50, at 293-94.
SS gnerally Getahn Ward, Pnison Realy Investors File Lawsuit over lergor, TENNESSEAN,
May 285 1999, at 3E (describing a lawsuit alleging improper disclosure of a transaction with
an affiliate).
...17 C.F.R. §§ 228.101-228.511, 229.101-229.511 (2000).
1
Id. § 230.408.
...Small, supra note 60, at 1211-12 ("[R]easonable men may still differ on whether a

particular fact is material."). Reflecting the fact that ascertaining materiality is a question
of judgment, materiality of information and adequacy of the discloture of material
information ordinarily are jury questions. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265,
1268 (9th Cir. 1987).
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disclosed, and in setting the nuance" 4 and the level of detail of that
disclosure.
Two sets of law firms participate in a traditional IPO: issuer's
counsel and underwriters' counsel. It is not merely the underwriters'
counsel that is responsible for disclosure of negative information and
requires negative information be disclosed. That is part of the role of
the issuer's counsel, and one that it fulfills (as is the case with all
professionals, to varying degrees) notwithstanding the protestations of
its client (the issuer). For example, the role played by a lawyer at a
prominent firm representing the issuer in one offering, in the drafting
of a portion of a prospectus describing a crucial risk (reliance on a
single supplier), was recounted as follows:
As always, the guy with the pen, in this case Dave Segre of Wilson Sonsini,
was the butt of much of this [humor]. He soon gained the nickname
Ernie.
Said [the issuer's chief financial officer], "I started calling him Ernest
Hemingway because every time we gave him a revision to the document,
the document came back looking very different from what we'd told him
to do. So I began accusing him of doing a Hemingway on me-you
know, creative writing. Eventually, we just called him Ernie.'15

In practice, when drafting the prospectus turns to disclosure of
negative information, the parties can, and frequently do, realign
themselves, with the lawyers on one side and the businessmen on the
other side.' 6

14

For example, one institutional investor's review of a prospectus was described as follows:

[A senior technology analyst for Hambrecht & Quist] next reached the seven
pages of charts and footnotes and again focused on the MD&A [management's
discussion and analysis of financial position and results of operations] section. This
time he read it line by line. "Oh, look! One more time we're reminded that
technology revenue is non-recurring. You can tell the lawyers were very careful on
that. They understood what the issue was."
MICHAEL S. MALONE, GOING PUBLIC 125 (1991).
Id. at 89.
.. Cf id. at 79 ("As one might imagine, choosing what goes into the risk factors section and
how it should be phrased often divides the prospectus writing team into opposing camps,
with the company representatives on one side, the lawyers on the other, and the undervriters
and everyone else dancing in between.").
The author's personal experience presented another paradigm: a game of "chicken"
between the lawyers Requiring disclosure of material businessmen would prcfcr not to
disclose does not enhance one's standing with one's client. Where the lawyers concur that
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IV.

EMPIRICAL MODELING OF LAW FIRM INVESTMENTS

A. Theory of the Models
One of the roles of lawyers participating in an IPO is to assure that
all material information about the issuer is disclosed to the public.
One condition to the closing of the IPO will be the delivery of legal
opinions that address whether the IPO prospectus is misleading." 7
Law firms perform the due diligence investigations referenced
above'" as part of rendering these opinions.
The principle to be addressed by the empirical models is whether
law firm investments affect the disclosure in an issuer's offering
document. The effect could be in the form of (i) not requiring
disclosure of information that would be required to be disclosed were
the law firm not to have an investment in the client; (ii) allowing the
disclosure to be in more innocuous language, i.e., burying the
disclosure; or (iii) decreased diligence procedures that result in the law
firm not becoming aware of adverse information that it otherwise
would uncover.
For this purpose, the empirical models examine the price at which
stock is sold in an IPO. That price "reflects" the disclosure, in the
sense that the price of the stock sold in the IPO should incorporate an
assessment of all material information contained in the final
prospectus.' q SEC rules require that those expected to purchase in

negative disclosure is required, one may postpone taking a hard line, i.e., postpone requiring
disclosure, until it becomes clear the other side's counsel will not.
"7 JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 50, at 90. It is customary to provide "negative
assurance" that the law firm is not aware of any information that would make the prospectus
misleading. Id.; Comm. on Legal Opinions, Third-PartyLegal OpinionReport, Including the Legal

Opinion Accord of the Section of Business Law, American Bar Association, 47 Bus. LAW. 167, 228
(1991)z Formally, this statement is different from providing a statement that the law firm. I
of the opinion that the prospectus is not misleading. Seegonrally Comm. on Legal Opinions,
supra, at 228 ("[he
format normally used is other than the traditional legal opinion .....
See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
It is possible the final prospectus would include disclosure not included in a preliminary
prospectus previously shown to prospective investors. However, where the additional
disclosure is material, ordinarily an issuer would recirculate a revised preliminary prospectus,
updated to reflect this additional disclosure, before the pricing of the offering. Cf JohaJ.

Jenkins, Recirculation ofa PreliminaryProspectus:Statutoy BasisandAnaytical Teckniquesfor Resolving
Recirculation Issues, 55 Bus. LAw. 135, 145 (1999) ("As is apparent from a review of the
provisions of the federal securities laws implicated in the recirculation issue, any decision
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the IPO be sent a preliminary prospectus at least forty-eight hours
before a confirmation of a sale is sent. 120 The managing underwriter
prices the IPO based on indications of interest received from
prospective purchasers.' 2 Indications of interest are not helpful to
the managing underwriter in pricing the offering to the extent they
are stale. The managing underwriter, therefore, has an incentive to
assure that indications of interest are based on all information that
will be disclosed in the final prospectus.
The IPO price therefore reflects the disclosure in the final
prospectus. The price per share is, in some sense, arbitrary. The
price itself is not meaningful, because the number of shares to be
outstanding after the offering affects the per share value of securities.
What is relevant, however, is a comparison-how does the fact that
a law firm has an interest in the issuer affect the change in price to the
actual IPO price from estimates prepared before the law firm's
diligence has commenced and the law firm has participated in
preparing the disclosure? Thus, the empirical models set forth below
examine the price per share change, on a dollar and on a percentage
basis, from an estimate prepared some period of time before the IPO
is priced. This price estimate is compared to the actual IPO price.
In particular, it is hypothesized that the price change will be greater
where the law firm has an interest in its client.
One final observation about the theory of the models merits
explanation. If a law firm interest in a client causes the law firm to
perform diminished diligence, one might expect the fact that a law
firm had invested in an issuer to decrease the price realized in an IPO
(i.e., a relationship opposite that described in the immediately
preceding paragraph).
If the market understood a law firm
investment to convey diminished certification of the issuer and its
disclosure, one might suppose that would cause a decrease in the
value investors would be willing to pay for the securities, ceteris
paribus, and therefore cause the price changes examined in the
models to be lower where the issuer is represented by a law firm that
has an interest in its client.

concerning recirculation should be based on whether the new disclosures contained in a
revised preliminary prospectus are 'material. '").
120 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-8(b) (2000).
M1Jaikaran Singh, Note, Watch rourMouth.Section 12(a)(2) Liabii yfor Oral Statements Made
at Road Shows, 23J. CORP. L. 541, 548 (1998).
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There are two reasons why that view does not affect the results of
the models described below. First, whatever information content is
associated with a law firm investment, that information concerning
investments made before the beauty pageant should already be
impounded in the estimate arrived at during the beauty pageant. The
models address a change in price from that estimate to the actual IPO
price. Were there such an effect, it should affect both the IPO price
and the estimate, producing no net effect on the price change from
the estimated IPO price to the actual IPO price.
Moreover, as discussed above, 2' 2 an issuer is strictly liable for false
or misleading statements in a prospectus by which it sells an IPO.
One might consider section 11 and Rule 1Ob-5 as providing a
warranty that the firm is as disclosed. Thus, absent unusual cases of
substantial fraud, e.g., fraud of a magnitude damages for which could
potentially render responsible parties insolvent, purchasers in an IPO
acquire rights valued at approximately the same value as the rights
that are described in the prospectus. Any deficiency in disclosure is
"made up" by the value of a right to a securities law claim.
The types of changes in disclosure that this model seeks to identify
are of the more modest type--shadings in disclosure or omission of
disclosure in the close cases. That is, the contemplated changes are
not so large as they would create potentially ruinous liability for the
issuer. Thus, the remedy provisions of section 11 and Rule 1Ob-5
should be adequate to allow purchasers not to decrease the price they
are willing to pay for securities in IPOs because the law firms have
interests in the issuers.
The best price to use as the initial price would be the estimated
price arrived at during the beauty pageant. That price, however, is
not publicly available. The models thus use, as a proxy for that price,
the estimated price first disclosed in a preliminary prospectus. The
price change examined thus is the change in price from that price
estimate to the actual IPO price. Prior finance literature has used this
price change for purposes of assessing the thoroughness of procedures
subsequent to the beauty pageant, i.e., for similar purposes.' 2 3
A substantial portion of the lawyers' due diligence will have
occurred by the time a preliminary prospectus disclosing an estimated

22
121

See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
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price will have been filed with the SEC. 2 ' Similarly, much of the
nuance of disclosure of identified adverse information will have been
determined as of that time. These facts, however, do not make
inappropriate the use of the estimated price first disclosed in a
preliminary prospectus as a proxy for the pricing discussed in the
beauty pageant. The reasons are set forth below.
Literature discussing the IPO process suggests' 25 investment banks
frequently delay delivery of negative information to prospective
issuers.
Books advising prospective IPO issuers on selecting
underwriters note prospective issuers should ask previous customers
about such delays. Some authors note prospective issuers should ask
previous clients about the difference between preliminary pricing and
final pricing' 26 or last-minute surprises. 27
An investment bank underwriting an IPO has two customers with
competing interests: the issuer and the investors, who will have
ongoing trading relationships with the investment bank. Investment
28
banks have increasingly favored the interests of the investors. 1
The reason for the delay in disclosing negative information is that,
over time, there is a shift in the relative bargaining strengths of the
parties. The passage of time impedes the ability of the issuer to
124

It will not end, however, until the end of the process, when the IPO is priced. See

PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Guide to Going Public 41 (1999) (noting that a due diligence
meeting will occur shortly before the prospectus
is finalized),
at
h t tp: / /w w w. p w c global . corn / ext web /p w cpu bI i cation s. nsf/Do cI D /
08EFF19170E0794E8525687800563767.
A principal concern at that time will be
expectations concerning the next quarter. And, as Johnson and McLaughlin note,
"[A]ccounting matters are too important to be left to the accountants." JOHNSON &
MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 50, at 287.
25 It is not surprising that the references -shouldbe oblique; it would often be contrary
to
an investment banker's financial interest to disclose publically an absence of candor with his
clients.
121STEPHEN C. BLOWERS ET AL., THE ERNST &YOUNG LLP GuI DE TO THEIPO VAI.UE
JOURNEY 88 (1999) ("Some questions you may wish to ask are:... Did the underwriters
significantly reduce the... estimated selling price during the registration process?"); DAVID
P. SUTrON & M. WILLIAM BENEDETTO, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFE;RINGS97 (1988) ("Questions
to ask the underwriter include the following:... How close to the preliminary pricing was
the final price for other deals?").
121 ARKEBAUER & SCHULTZ, supra note 6, at 170 ("Some questions to ask include these:
Were there any last-minute surprises?"); BLOWERS ET AL., supra note 126, at 88 ("Did the
underwriters present any last-minute surprises or demands?").
12 Shawn Tully, Betrayal on Wall Street, FORTUNE, May 14, 2001, at 84, LEXIS, News
Library, Allnws File.
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change underwriters, as some of the pre-IPO activities, e.g., some
diligence, would have to be repeated were the managing underwriter
replaced."' Thus, two commentators, in discussing IPOs of firms in
the biotechnology field, write, "Pricing is a factor that caught many
senior managers by surprise. By the time the pricing meeting occurs,
companies typically are not negotiating from a position of
strength."' 0 One commentator provides a similar, but more detailed
view:
Stock prices are typically set just days before the issue, when the state of
the market and the health of the company are pretty well known. Pricing
sessions often become the moment when the first hints of distrust between
the company and underwriters surface. Wars can break out over a dollar
a share difference, lifelong animosities can develop over four bits.
Underwriters see the pricing session as the moment when their wisdom
and expertise in the stock market come to the fore and when they often
have to pull company executives down out of the clouds to reality, force
them to abandon their greedy personal dreams of wealth, and face the fact
they are about to be a public company, answerable to shareholders. The
company executives, in turn, often come away from the pricing session
embittered. Until this moment, the underwriter may have seemed to be
their greatest advocate, but now, when it is too late to turn back, the
underwriter turns on them; indifferent to the company's needs, the
underwriter now takes care of its own image, low-balling the price to
guarantee the maximum number of shares sold to look good in the
proposal to the next sucker. 31

Reflecting the assessment that the price estimate disclosed in a
preliminary prospectus is an appropriate proxy for the price discussed
in the beauty pageant, Cooney et al. indicate that material deviations

129Segeneralyl Nicholas Denton, Deutsche Telekom in Row with Investment Bankers, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 1996, at 1, LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File ("Deutsche Telekom has excluded
Goldman Sachs from a leading role in the flotation of one of its associated companies after
a row with the US investment bank over the pricing of Deutsche Telekom's current initial
public offering.").
3 Carol Hall & Cynthia Robbins-Roth, Going Public Without Panic, RECORDER, May 6,
1992, at 8, LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File; see also The Making ofa Millionaire, INC., May
1995, at 86, LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File (describing the underwriters as stating a price
in a particular IPO with a message, "take it or leave it").
3' MALONE, supra note 114, at 197-98. One chief financial officer described pricing
discussions more colorfully: "I feel like I've been to a proctologist-and he had a very cold
finger." Robert D. Hof& Gabrielle Saveri, Inside an Internet IPO, Bus. WK., Sept. 6, 1999,
at 60, LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
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of the actual IPO price fiom the estimate disclosed in the preliminary
of pricing issues previously
prospectus imply a renegotiation
13 2
addressed in the beauty pageant.
Using the estimated price first disclosed in a preliminary prospecu s
as a proxy for the price estimate arrived at during the beauty pageant
in fact creates a bias against the models finding results. If there is a
relationship between law firm investments and price adjustment from
the beauty pageant to the actual IPO price, examining price changes
from the first circulated preliminary prospectus to the IPO price
simply eliminates a portion of the actual price changes in which one
isinterested. Elimrinatig si tie ,fthe price changes makes idei i.fyig
the changes more difficult.
B. Data
For this investigation, a sample of IPOs in 1998 and 1999 was
assembled. Using the Securities Data Company (SDC) database, all
common stock IPOs in those two years were identified. The sample
was reduced to 665 IPOs by eliminating the following IPOs: offerings
of issuers in the areas of finance, insurance, and real estate; offerings
involving combinations of stock and warrants, including units; and
offerings in which SDC's data were incomplete. Those financial,
insurance, and real estate firms were identified by the reported primary SIC code-issuers with primary SIC codes in the range of 6011
to 6799 were eliminated. This step eliminates a number of IPOs of
firns having characteristics not relevant to dis investigation, such as
offerings of real estate investment trusts with no prior operating
history, and unusual IPOs, such as offerings as part of the demutualization of insurance companies.
Forty-seven offerings for which SDC did not report all the information required in the regressions below were removed, reducing the
sample to 618 offerings.' Various statistics of those 618 offerings for
which the corresponding prospectuses could be located through
EDGAR (the SEC's database of filings) are reported in Table 1.

12

John W. Cooneyjr, et al., The IPO Partial-Adjustment Phenomenon and Underwriter

Reputation 2 (Feb. 28, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
' The author's experience using this database indicates that SDC periodically updates

the historical information for offerings; the offerings within a specified time period meeting
certain criteria or for which certain fields of informqation arc providcd may vary when oice
accesses the database at different times.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of 618 IPOs in 1998 and 1999

Mean
Price Adjustment ($)
1.34
Price Adjustment(%)
12.45
Offer Price (S)
13.64
Estimated Offer Price ($)
12.30
Law Firm Investment ($)
292,328
Any Issuer's Lawyer Investment (%)
36
Underwriter Rank (%)
6.25
Est. Offer Size ($100 millions)
0.94
Est. Price to Book Value
5.98
Pre-IPO Equity Value
4.20
($100 millions)
Issue Year
1998.65
Greater San Francisco Lawyers (%)
27

Standard
Median Deviation
0.97
3.75
7.69
34.49
13.21
5.98
11.68
4.65
0 1,459,721
3.99
0.48
3.69
1.40

7.14
2.75
11.68
16.34

Min

Max

-6.91
32.11
-58.33
344.44
3.95
94.39
2.19
87.58
0 24,159,073
0.01
0.03
0.40
0.00

27.15
41.52
230.41
223.95

As reported in Table 1, those statistics include the mean [median]
of the following variables: offer price per share of$13.64134 [$13.21];
estimated offerprice (constituting the estimated offer price first disclosed
in a preliminary prospectus, or the midpoint in the case of an estimate
in the form of a range) of $12.30 [$11.68]; price adjustment (representing the offer price minus estimated offerprice) of $1.34 [$0.97]; percentage price adjustment of 12.45% [7.69%]; initially estimated domestic

offer size, based on the preliinary prospectus, of $94 million [$48
million], excluding the overallotment option (referenced as the est.
offer size); the estimated offer price to book value, at the tine of the IPO
(est. price to book value), of 5.98 [3.69]; and Pre-IPO equity value (shares

outstanding before the IPO times the estimated offer price) of $420
million [$140 million].
Underwriter annual market shares, in terms of the dollar amount
of IPOs lead managed, of all the non-financial, common stock IPOs

"3 All dollar amounts in this paper are expressed in 1997 dollars, deflated using the
implicit GDP price deflator.
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in 1998 and 1999 were computed.13 5 In these computations, the
entire IPO was generally assigned to the managing underwriter of the
offering. In a few cases, SDC indicates an IPO has two managing
underwriters. In those cases, one-half the IPO was assigned to each
of those investment banks. The mean [median] of the underwriter
market share, referenced below as the underwriter rank, is 6 .25 %
[3.99%].
SEC rules for IPOs expressly require that a prospectus, unless in
the more abbreviated format used by small business issuers, disclose
any "substantial" interest owned in an issuer by a law firm
representing the issuer or the underwriters. 136 The rules applicable to
small business issuers do not expressly require disclosure of interests
owned prior to the offering-the expressly required disclosure is
limited to contingent fees or interests acquired around the time of the
offering.1 37 However, there is a general requirement that a prospectus
include all material information, even if the information is not
expressly required to be disclosed. 13 Thus, even small business
issuers would be obligated to disclose those investments where
material to assessing the roles played by counsel.
Each prospectus was reviewed to identify disclosure of interests of
legal counsel to be owned as of the consummation of the IPO. For
example, the prospectus for theJune 1998 IPO of Inktomi discloses
the following interest of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, counsel
to the issuer: "As of the date of this prospectus, WS Investment
Company 97A, an investment partnership composed of certain
current and former members of and persons associated with Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Professional Corporation, beneficially

"' This market share information is derived from the 618 IPOs in the sample and an
additional forty even non financia5 common stock IPOs for which SDC reported size and
underwriter information, although other information used in the models was not reported.
Professionals participating in IPOs can change their names over time. Those name
changes can result from mergers, changes in business form, or marketing reasons
unaccompanied by a substantive change in the organization. In addition, the SDC database
occasionally has typographical errors in firm names. Each law firm and investment bank
name reported by SDC wa manually reviewed for purposes ofidentifying thote alternative
names that should be referenced as a single firm.
13 17 C.F.R. § 229.509 (2000).
117 Id. § 228.509. Interests not more than $50,000 are expressly not subject to disclosure.

Id.
138

Id. § 230.408.
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owns an aggregate of 12,829 shares of the Company's Common
Stock." 3 As in this example, the interest is generally stated in terms
of the number of shares owned.
The disclosure can take other forms. For example, the prospectus
can indicate that the law firm owns preferred stock to be converted
into common stock at the closing of the IPO. 1" Or the interest may
be owned by an individual lawyer.' 4 ' Occasionally, the disclosure
indicates that lawyers are expected to purchase stock in the IPO itself
or otherwise are going to have an increased interest as of the closing
of the IPO.' 42 In each case, an aggregate law firm interest was
computed, consisting of the extent of the beneficial interest owned as
of consummation of the IPO by the issuer's law firm and lawyers
associated with that law firm, valued at the estimated offer price
described above.
The mean [median] interest (referenced as lawfirm investment) was
valued at $292,328 [$0]. The issuer's law firm disclosed it had an
equity interest in the issuer (whether quantified or not) in 36%
(referenced as any issuer's lawyer investment) of the IPOs. Two of the
offerings had unusually high interests. The three greatest interests
were valued at $24 million, $23 million, and $4.6 million. The
percentage of offerings in which there were these interests (quantified
or not) increased from 1998 (30%) to 1999 (40%). The mean investment, however, actually decreased slightly over these two years$299,253 in 1998 to $288,527 in 1999.
A material number of these offerings involved law firms that participated only infrequently in the IPO process. For example, in only
433 of these 618 IPOs did the issuer's law firm represent issuers at
least three times in non-financial IPOs in the 1998 through 1999
period.

131Inktomi Corp., 2,254,000 Shares of Common Stock 62 (June 12, 1998) (prospectus),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 1024302/0001012870-98-001571 .txt.
'" E.g., Calico Commerce, Inc., 4,000,000 Shares of Common Stock 69, 91 (Oct. 6, 1999)
(prospectus), http: / /www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 1081154/
0000891618-99-004480-index.html.
"' E.g., Xpedior Corp., 8,535,000 Shares of Common Stock 76 (Dec. 15, 1999),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1096287/0000950129-99-005447 -index.html.
,2E.g., Agency.com Ltd., 5,900,000 Shares of Common Stock 89 (Dec. 8, 1999)
(registration statement), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1086403/ 000091205799-008583-index.html.
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SEC rules also require disclosure of interests owned by
underwriters' counsel.'4 3 In only seven IPOs was that type of interest
disclosed. Based on the small frequency, interests of underwriters'
counsel were disregarded.
Occasionally, the existence of an interest is disclosed without an
indication of its magnitude.'
In those cases, a lawfirm investment of
zero was assigned. Also disregarded were contingent fee arrangements, in which issuer's counsel contracted to receive a larger fee if
the IPO were successfully completed. The prospectus for the 1998
IPO of Advanced Communications Group provides an example. In
that case, the prospectus states the issuer's counsel would "receive a
premium over their normal hourly billing rates for the legal services
performed by them in connection with the Offering if the Offering is
completed and [would] accept a substantially reduced
fee payment
45
in the event that the Offering is not completed."
The prospectus disclosure generally does not identify the date of
the law firm investment. Thus, the prospectus disclosure does not
typically allow one to assess whether the investment was made within
a few months of the IPO, i.e., subsequent to the beauty pageant.
However, part II of each of the forms of registration statements on
which IPOs are required to be filed require that an issuer disclose
recent sales of unregistered securities. 46 This information was
reviewed in an attempt to determine for the offerings in the data set
whether any investment by the issuers' law firms had taken place
shortly before the corresponding IPOs. However, the scope of the
disclosure frequently given is insufficient for this purpose; the
identities of those making purchases at various times frequently are
omitted.
Identifying the timing of investments could be important. Consider
an issuer about whom favorable information became known after the
beauty pageant. If lawyers could learn this information and invest

17 C.F.R. §§ 228.509, 229.509 (2000).
" E.g., Reltec Corp., 5,500,000 Shares of Common Stock 71 (Mar. 12, 1998),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1052637/0001047469-98-009809.txt.
145 Advanced Communications Group Inc., 8,000,000 Shares of Common Stock 90 (Feb.
12,1998), http://www.sec.gov/Archivcs/edgar/data/1047643/0000950136-98-000292.txt.
146 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.701, 229.701 (2000); Form S-1, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
7121,
at 6239, Item 15 (issue no. 1965, Feb. 21, 2001); Form SB-2, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
7313, at 6509, Item 26.
143
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between the beauty pageant and the offering, that would produce a
positive relationship between law firm investment and price adjustment.
That relationship would be independent of change in performance of
professional duties aising from the law firm investment.
There are a few reasons to expect why investments in that time
frame-between the beauty pageant, based on information first
known after the beauty pageant, and the IPO date-are unlikely.
First, as noted above, 4' 7 the time period is short-generally only a few
months. Second, for the investment to occur, the issuer must sell the
securities (assuming, as ordinarily will be the case,' 4 8 there is no
market in the securities). It does not seem likely that an issuer will
decide to sell securities in a private placement while it is in the process
of registering its IPO. Doing so raises integration issues; the sale
might not be exempt from registration because it would be integrated
into-considered a part of-the pending public offering. 4' 9
After the beauty pageant, a law firm could elect or arrange to take
its fee for the IPO in stock. That could give rise to an interest created
between the beauty pageant and the closing of the IPO that could be
reflected in the data. Anecdotal evidence suggests that does not
principally account for the law firm interests. 50
Popular press reports indicate San Francisco area lawyers are more
likely to invest in firms they take public than their East Coast
counterparts.' 5' For this reason, offering statistics were separately
prepared for offerings SDC reports as involving lawyers located either
7 See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
148 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.

See generally 3 LOss & SELIGMAN, supra note 78, at 1231-48 (3d ed., rev. vol. 1999)
(discussing integration).
""8See Miller, supra note 14, at 438-41 (noting that a firm known for taking equity stakes
indicates those interest are not in lieu of hourly fees, although payment of the hourly fees
may be deferred until financing has been obtained); Baker, supra note 5 (quoting the general
counsel of a prominent California-based firm known for taking these interests as saying, "It
is a great myth that most firms in California make investments by taking stock as fees....
We've always felt that when you're running a law firm, you get paid for what you do, and
you get paid in cash.").

...
Renee Deger, Taking Stock- Cashing in Bg on Client IPOs, RECORDERJan. 21, 1999, at
1. But cf. Coffee, supra note 4 (stating, in discussing an SEC no-action letter addressed to
Ropes & Gray, a Boston-based law firm, concerning whether law firm investment vehicles
are subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l to -64 (1994 &
Supp. V 1999), "At a minimum, this SEC action shows that stock for legal services appears
to have become acceptable even among the Boston Brahmins.").
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inside or outside the greater San Francisco area (San Francisco, Palo
Alto, and Menlo Park). Twenty-seven percent of the issuers engaged
lawyers located in the greater San Francisco area. Table 2 reports
statistics for the offerings in which SDC reports the issuers' lawyers
were not from the greater San Francisco area, with the information
for offerings involving lawyers SDC reports as being in the greater
San Francisco area in Table 3. Consistent with the notion expressed
in the popular press, the issuer's lawyer had an interest in its client of
any type, quantified in the prospectus or not, in twenty-seven percent
of the offerings involving issuers' lawyers from outside the greater San
Francisco area, whereas the corresponding number for offerings
involving issuers' lawyers from the greater San Francisco area was
sixty-one percent. There are similar differences in the mean value of
the law firm investment in the issuer-$226,733 for offerings
involving issuers' lawyers from outside the greater San Francisco area
and $469,474 for offerings involving issuers' lawyers from the greater
San Francisco area.
C Regressions
To investigate the relationship between IPO price and law firm
investment, ordinary least squares regressions were prepared. The
dependent variable in each regression, referenced as the price
adjustment, reflects the change from the estimated offer price per share
first disclosed in a preliminary prospectus (the midpoint in the case of
a range), referenced as the estimated offer price, to the actual IPO price
per share. The change from the estimated offerprice to the actual offer
price has been previously used in the finance literature for examining
the extent of the activity taken by participants-in that case, the
52
underwriters-before an IPO.1

152 Kathleen

Weiss Hanley, The UndcrpricingofInitialPublic Offerings and the PartialAdjustment

Phenomenon, 34J. FIN. ECON. 231, 241 (1993).
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for 451 IPOs in 1998-1999 Where
the Issuer's Lawyers Were Not from the Greater San Francisco Area
Standard
Median Deviation
Mean
3.67
0.49
0.80
Price Adjustment (S)
34.27
4.55
7.85
Price Adjustment (%)
6.44
12.84
13.48
Offer Price ($)
5.23
11.85
12.68
Estimated Offer Price ($)
1,245,908
0
226,733
Law Firm Investment CS)
27
Any Issuer's Lawyer Investment (%)
7.13
3.68
5.62
Underwriter Rank (%)
3.19
0.49
1.09
Est. Offer Size ($100 millions)
6.83
3.51
5.15
Est. Price to Book Value
18.84
1.32
4.69
Pre-IPO Equity Value
($100 millions)
1998.60
Issue Year

Max
Min
32.11
-6.91
344.44
-58.33
94.39
3.95
87.58
2.19
0 23,069,852
0.01
0.03
0.40
0.00

27.15
41.52
96.24
223.95

Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for 167 IPOs in 1998-1999 Where
the Issuer's Lawyers Were from the Greater San Francisco Area
Standard
Mean
Median Deviation
3.60
2.92
2.79
Price Adjustment (S)
32.00
23.08
24.87
Price Adjustment (%)
4.49
13.62
14.07
Offer Price (S)
2.19
10.70
11.28
Estimated Offer Price (S)
469,474 120,378 1,915,354
Law Firm Investment (S)
61
Any Issuer's Lawyer Investment (%)
6.89
5.45
7.94
Underwriter Rank (%)
0.39
0.44
0.53
Est. Offer Size ($100 millions)
19.32
8.22
4.31
ESt. Price to Book Value
5.27
1.57
2.87
Pre-IPO Equity Value
($100 millions)
1998.78
Issue Year

Max
Min
17.52
-4.94
150.00
-41.67
33.08
6.81
21.41
6.33
0 24,159,073
0.05
0.12
0.74
0.04

26.67
3.57
230.41
60.25
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For each set of independent variables used, results are reported for
models having as a dependent variable the price adjustment, expressed
in either dollars or on a percentage basis. This variable and all other
variables in units of dollars were deflated using the GDP implicit
price deflator (1997=100). As discussed above,5 the estimated offer
priceprovides, and has been described by others as providing, a proxy
for the price arrived at during the beauty pageant. That price should
reflect all material information that can be practicably conveyed to
investment banks about the issuer during the beauty pageant.
The focus of the empirical examination is relationship betweenprice
adjustment and a measure of law firm investment. A proper model,
however, cannot include only these two variables. Rather, a proper
model must include other factors that are hypothesized to affect the
price adjustment. For example, one might expect there to be a
relationship between the type of investment bank and these price
adjustments. For example, low-quality investment banks might be
more prone to lying during the beauty pageant-overstating the
anticipated price to secure business-than their more reputable
colleagues. A proper model should take that into account. Thus, a
proper empirical model can take the form of considering the price
adjustment as being a function of a variety of other factors, including
the measure of the law firm investment and other variables, such as
the prestige of the managing underwriter, that influence the price
adjustment.
Reflecting these considerations, a relationship of the following form
is considered:
price adjustment =
A + A3, law finn investment term +

f

otherfactor, + ... A + , otherfactorn

In this model, the A3s represent coefficients, which are estimated in
the regressions.
Preparation of the model requires specification of the other factors
that may influence the price adjustment. In other circumstances, one
might need to include numerous variables reflecting the
characteristics of the firm. However, in this case, the choice of the

'

See supra note 132.
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dependent variable, price adjustment, decreases the number of other
variables that are needed. This variable reflects the change in price
from an estimate that is based on various characteristics of the issuer.
Thus, only additional variables bearing on matters that may produce
a bias in the original estimate, given those firm characteristics, need
be incorporated in the model.
The additional variables used include the following: A variable
representing the managing underwriter's market share, underwriter
rank, for which descriptive statistics are described above,' 54 is included.
The managing underwriter's prestige may affect how it approaches
valuation during the beauty pageant and, therefore, be associated
with the price adjustment. Underwriter market share has been
used in the finance literature as a proxy for underwriter
previously
15'
quality.
Three additional variables address aspects of the issuer and its
contemplated offering diat niay affect die price adjustinsent: lug(eel.
offer size), est. price to book value and log(Pre-IPOequity value). The dollar
amounts for the first and third variables are expressed in $100
millions.
The estimated size of the offer will affect competition during the
beauty pageant. The fees paid to investment banks for underwriting
an IPO are a percentage of the offer size, typically approximately
seven percent. "' Larger offerings therefore can attract greater
interest from prospective underwriters. The level of the competition
in the beauty pageant may affect the level of aggressiveness
investment banks bring to estimating the IPO price.
To incorporate the size of the offering, the models use the variable
log(est. offer size), defined as the natural logarithm of the estimated size
of the domestic portion of the offering, as initially disclosed in a
preliminary prospectus (excluding the overallotment option),' 5 7
expressed in $100 millions. The natural logarithm of the variable is
151 See

supra tbls. 1-3.

, Megginson & Weiss, supra note 42, at 890.
Hsuan-Chi Chen &Jay R. Ritter, 7he Seven PercentSolution, 55J. FIN. 1105, 1105 (2000).
An overallotment option refer- to additional shares the undervriters have the option
to purchase, to cover overallotmcnts of shares in the offering, i.e., sales of shares in an
aggregate amount greater than the number of shares the underwriters are required to
purchase in the offering. 1LOSs & SIIIGMAN, supra note 78, at 336-37 (3d ed. 1989). The
option can be for no more than fifteen percent of the number of shares the underwriters
agree to purchase. See id. at 337.
'
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used, because the effect is not expected to be linear-a $10 million
increase in size is much more important for an offering that otherwise
would be only $5 million than one that otherwise would be $1 billion.
In prior finance literature examining securities offerings, actual
offer size, as opposed to estimated size, has been used.' 58 However,
Hansen identifies concerns with that variable. 159 Changes in the offer
price will cause corresponding changes in the size of an offering,
holding constant the number of shares offered. This fact could result
in a spurious correlation between actual proceeds and IPO price, and
could adversely affect other relationships.
A second additional variable, log(est. price to book value), is
incorporated, which bears on the difficulty in valuing the issuer
during the beauty pageant. This variable equals the natural
logarithm of the ratio of the estimated offer price to book value, as of
closing of the IPO. Estimated prices may vary more for IPOs to be
priced at a substantial variance from book value.
A third additional variable incorporated in the models is log(Pre IPO
equity value), which is the natural logarithm of the product, expressed
in $100 millions, of the number of shares outstanding before the IPO
multiplied by the estimated offer price. This variable may also address
factors relevant to the ease of estimating the actual IPO price.
Because there are regional variations in the extent to which law
firms invest in their clients, and, in particular, in the San Francisco
area, some models (Models 3 through 6) incorporate a dummy
variable reflecting the participation of lawyers representing the issuer
from the greater San Francisco area (including San Francisco, Menlo
Park, and Palo Alto). In addition, some models (Models 5 and 6)
interact the lawyer investment variables of interest with this location
variable.
At various times, the IPO market, and segments of the IPO market
based on the line of business of the issuer, are "hot."6 A dummy

...E.g., Richard B. Carter et al., Undmrriter Reputation, Initial Returns, and the Long Run
PerformanceofIPO Stocks, 53J. FIN. 285, 292 (1998) ("The natural logarithm of gross proceeds
...har been included in virtually all previous work,"); Megginson & Weiss, supra note 12,
at 896.
!. Robert S. IHan3cn, Do Ihwcstinent BtudjCuinpdtt "' IPOj. 77a Adoo uf tl,"7% Pj
Contract",59J. FIN. EcON. 313, 339 (2001).
160 Franlin Alen & Cerald R. Faulhaber, Signalig by Underpicing in the
IPO Market, 23J.
FIN. EcON. 303, 303, 316 (1989).
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variable for the year of issue was included for 1998 (1999 being the
"hold-out"). In addition, the models account for "hot" IPO market
segments by incorporating certain dummy variables identifying
primary two-digit SIC issuer codes. Dummy variables were included
in each model for each two-digit SIC code for which there are at least
three IPOs in the sample in each year studied, a criterion suggested
by another investigation of offerings. 6 ' There were fourteen of those
162
two-digit SIC code classifications.
The price of an IPO may change from the beauty pageant estimate
in response to changes in the overall market. For this reason, each of
the models incorporates a variable reflecting a change in the
NASDAQ Composite Index, from the initial filing date reported by
SDC to the business day before the commencement of the IPO. The
NASDAQComposite Index information was taken from the Center
for Research in Security Prices database. In models having a
dependent variable having units of dollars, the variable (referenced
below as NASDA Qchange x est. offer price) consists of:
]ASDAQ(business day bfore IPO) NASDA Q (day prelirinay prospects-fild) e
NASDA Q (day preliminay prospectusfiled)

where "NASDAQ' references the closing price of the NASDAQ
Composite Index for the identified day. In models having a
dependent variable having units of percentage points, the variable
reflecting the change in the NASDAQComposite Index (referenced
below as NASDA Qchange (%)) consists of the percentage change in the
NASDAQComposite Index from the date the preliminary prospectus
was filed to the business day before the IPO.

S"&ec
Craig C: Dunbar FactorsAffecting Investmnt Bank Initial Public Offe*ringMarktShare, 55
J. FIN. ECON. 3, 23 n.6 (2000).
1152 Those SIC classifications were 20 (Food and Kindred Products); 27 (Printing,
Publishing, and Allied Industries); 28 (Chemicals and Allied Products); 35 (Industrial and
Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment); 36 (Electronic and Other Electrical
Equipment and Components, Except Computer Equipment); 38 (Measuring, Analyzing, and
Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical and Optical Goods; Watches and Clocks);
47 (Transportation Services); 48 (Communications); 50 (Wholesale Trade-durable Goods);
51 (Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods); 59 (Miscellaneous Retail); 73 (Business
Services); 80 (Health Services); and 87 (Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management,
and Related Services). Seegeneraly http://www.osha.gov/oshstats/sicser.html (last visited
Sept. 9, 2001) (identifying SIC code groups).
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1. Offering-Specific Investments
That completes the variables used to identify firm-specific or
offering-specific characteristics. The final specification of the models
requires more precise identification of the law firm investment term.
Empirical models were prepared using two different forms of law firm
investment term. For one set of models-those presented in Table
4-the law firm investment term is the variable log(l+ Law Firm
Investment). This variable consists of the natural logarithm of one plus
the dollar amount of the issuer's law firm's beneficial interest in the
issuer, in deflated dollars, based on the estimated offerprice referenced
above.
These models therefore address whether there is a
relationship between an investment in the particular issuer by its law
firm and pricing.
The equation representing the principal models (Models 1 and 2)
presented in Table 4 therefore is of the form:
price adjustment =
+S

, log( + lawfirm investment) + /3. undewriterrank + A3 log(est. offer
size) + A34 log (est. price to book value) + /35 log(pre - IPO equity value) +
SIC code classification dummy I +... A3,g SIC code classification dummy, 4 +
/32oyear of issue dummy + B21 NASDAQ variable
Results for models using that dependent variable are presented in
Table 4.
The results in Table 4 show a positive relationship between law
firm investment, expressed in terms of dollars, and the price
adjustment. The relationship is significant' a at the 1% level (twotailed) in the model that does not include the San Francisco dummy
variable (see Table 4, Model 1). When that variable is included, the
relationship is significant at the 10% level (see Table 4, Model 3), and
is significant at the 10% level when interacted with the participation
of a law firm located outside the greater San Francisco area (see
Table 4, Model 5). The variable is not significant when interacted

163 All significance levels have been computed using heteroskedasticity-corrected standard
errors, following White's procedure. SeeHalbert White,A Heteroskedasticiy-ConsistentCovariance
Matrix Estimator and a Direct Testfor Heteroskedasticit, 48 ECoNOMET RICA 817 (1980).
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with the participation of a greater San Francisco area law firm (see
Table 4, Model 5). The relationship is of the same sign, but, with one
exception, not statistically significant when examining percentage
price adjustment.
2. Frequency of Investment in Clients
The frequency with which lawyers invest in their clients has
increased over time and has varied among communities. As noted
above,' 6 4 data from the sample and popular press reports both
indicate San Francisco area lawyers are more likely to invest in firms
they take public thai their East Coast counterparts. Other anecdotal
evidence indicates that there may be different standards of legal
practice among different communities and, in particular, in that area
of California."'
The models presented in Table 4 address a relationship between
a law firm's investment in a particular issuer and the performance by
the lawyers in their representation of that client. However, there
could be a second type of relationship between law firm investment
and law firm performance. As is the case with professionals generally,
lawyers will vary in terms of how they approach their professional
duties. Some will be more aggressive than others in requiring
disclosure. Some will be more willing to invest in their clients than
others. These two characteristics may be related-lawyers more
willing to invest in their clients may generally require different levels
of disclosure, even in the case of issuers in which they do not have an
equity interest. To put it another way, lawyers that are conservative,
relative to their peers, in construing their ethical obligations, and who
therefore avoid taking financial interests in their clients, may also be
conservative, relative to their peers, in the sense of requiring more, or
more detailed, disclosure in prospectuses of adverse information. If so,
there should be a relationship between the frequency with which the
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lauyeras TransactionCost Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REV. 239,
249-50 (1995) ("[A Silicon Valley] lawyer noted, 'when I deal with lawyers in other parts
of the country, they. . ,wmM
go crazy over a ot of .wffthat woutdjvt draw a yawn from a
Silicon Valley law firm. "'). See generallyJohn C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover
Defenses:Blame the Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1383 (2001) (concluding, after an empirical
analysis, "Silicon Valley law firms... seem to have provided inferior advice to IPO clients
on takeover defenses in the early 1990s.").
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law firm has an equity interest in the firms that it takes public and the
price realized in an IPO.
For this purpose, one can define a variable for each law firm equal
to the percentage of the issuers that law firm represented in IPOs in
which the law firm had a beneficial equity interest of some type. This
variable is referenced as the fiequency issuer's lawyer invests.'6 6 The
results of the models incorporating this variable are presented in
Table 5.
To reflect this alternative formulation, Models 1 and 2 presented
in Table 5 are therefore of the form:
price adjustment =

Io

+ /3 log(1 +freq. issuer's lawyer invests) + 2 underwriter rank +
log(est. offer size) + 4 log (est. price to book value) + # log(pre - IPO equity
value) + 16 SIC code classification dummy, +... A39 SIC code classification
dummy 14 + /2oyear of issue dummy + B 21 NASDAQvariable

Table 5 addresses the relationship between price adjustment and the
frequency with which the law firm invests in clients it takes public.
The results show a positive relationship, significant at the 1% level in
the models not incorporating the San Francisco dummy variable (see
Table 5, Models 1 and 2), and significant at the 5% level for models
incorporating the San Francisco dummy variable (see Table 5,
Models 3 and 4). The level of significance is the same, whether the
dependent variable is stated on a dollar or on a percentage basis.
Variables interacting the frequency of law firm investment with San
Francisco or non-San Francisco dummy variables are only significant
in the non-San Francisco cases (see Table 5, Models 5 and 6).

166

In particular, the variable equals the fraction, expressed as a percentage, computed as

follows: The numerator is the number of IPOs in the sample in which the law firm
participated and had a beneficial interest in the issuer (whether quantified or not). The
denominator of the fraction is the number of IPOs in the sample in which that law firm
participated. For example, if a law firm participated in four IPOs in the sample and it had
a beneficial equity interest in one of those issuers, then the variable fiequen issur's lauyr

invests for each of those four IPOs would be twenty-five percent.
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The results reported in Table 5 are all based on a restricted
subsample of 432 IPOs in which the issuer's law firm participated in
at least three IPOs in the sample. That limitation restricts the sample
to offers in which the issuer's law firm has participated in a sufficient
number of IPOs to have some pattern of investment (or absence of
investment). To confirm the robustness of the results, Models 5 and
6 in Table 5 were re-estimated on the sub-sample of IPOs in which
the issuer's law firm participated in at least five offerings. The results
were similar, with -statistics for the variable not San Ftancicoxfequency
issuer's lawyer invests (%) in Models 5 and 6 of 2.37 and 2.40,
respectively, as compared to 2.43 and 2.35 for the reported results in
Models 5 and 6, respectively.
D. Analysis of Results
Different persons might construe the results reported above in
different fashions. One might argue that any results are produced by
an inadequate methodology. That argument would be: (i) the timeframe examined was one in which certain IPOs (those of certain
technology firms) performed unusually well; (ii) the participation of
lawyers from the greater San Francisco area is associated with issuers
i1 ialt industry; and (iii) the indushiy coittrols are inadequate. I Jsr of
ini itlels simnilar to those used in the existing literature, as done in this
article,' 6 7 decreases the concern that improper model specification
accounts for any results. The data set used in this article consists of
essentially all non-financial, common stock IPOs over the most recent
two-year period ended before work on this investigation was
The sizes of data sets used in other empirical
commenced.
examinations of IPOs are of magnitudes similar to that of the data set
used in this study.'6 8 It is clear, however, that the nature of these

lt7

See supra note 161 and accompanying text.

"
See, e.g., Randolph P. Beatty & Jay R. Ritter, Investment Banking, Reputation, and the
UnderpricingofInitialPublic Offerings, 13J. FIN. ECON. 213, 222 (1986) (using a sample of 545
firms in a model); Randolph P. Beatty & Ivo Welch, Isuer Expenses and Lgal Liability in Initial
Public Offerings, 39 J.L. & EcON. 545, 556 (examining 960 initial public offerings over a
three year period); Megginson & Weiss supra note 42, at 894 tbl.VI (examining 991 [POP
and a subset (matched sample) of 640 IPOs).
The adequacy of the data set used in this Article can be assessed by comparison with
that used in another piece of prominent legal literature. Alexander prepared a studyJanet
Cooper Alexander, Do the MeritsMatter? A Study ofSettlements in Securities ClassActions, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 497 (1991), which was heavily relied upon by the proponents of the Private
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relationships may change over time. Thus, for example, Beatty and
Welch find the relationship between investment bank quality and
IPO underpricing changed sign from the early 1980s to the early
1990s. "6,
Alternatively, if the methodology is considered satisfactory, one
may inquire as to whether any price effect is only associated with the
participation of greater San Francisco area lawyers (the results for
each San Francisco dummy variable-not the interaction variablesin Table 4 being significant). One can argue there is some evidence
consistent with a general relationship, i.e., a price association that is
not specific to the participation of greater San Francisco area lawyers.
The pertinent results are as follows:
First, in the results of Model 3 of Table 4, after accounting for
whether greater San Francisco area lawyers participate, the p-value
for rejecting the hypothesis that law firm investment in the particular
issuer is not associated with price adjustment, on a dollar basis, is
0.063. This result provides some evidence consistent with a price
association that is not confined to participation of lawyers from the
greater San Francisco area.
Second, in the results of Model 5 of Table 4, after accounting for
whether greater San Francisco area lawyers participate, the p-value
for rejecting the hypothesis that a law firm investment in the
particular issuer, when interacted with the participation of non-San
Francisco lawyers, is not associated with price adjustment, on a dollar
basis, is 0.063. This result also provides some evidence consistent
with a price association that is not confined to participation of lawyers
from the greater San Francisco area.
Third, in the results of Model 3 of Table 5, after accounting for
whether greater San Francisco area lawyers participate, the p-value
for rejecting the hypothesis that the general frequency of law firm

Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737. Lerach,
supra note 83 at 598, She concluded that for an important class of securities litigation,
"expcctcd trial outcomes seem to have little if any influence on the settlement amount."
Alexandcr, supra, at 596. Thc cmpirical basis of hcr conclu3ion5 was derivcd from a 3ample
of nine IPOs, in the first half of 1983, all of computer or computer-related companies. See i.
at 510, 517 tbl.4. Sx gm-mrtxlly Leonard B. Simon & William S. Dato, L-gislating on a False
of ihePrivate Setu iii LtigationRtrn,Act of 1995,
Fuwul'ult: 2.Te Erroneow Atwiueini Lulrqais
33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 959, 966 76 (1996) (criticizing die size of Alexawdei's sample uid
her restriction of her sample to a particular induGtry, referenced as "convenience sampling").
169 Beatty & Welch, supra note 168, at 556, 588-89.
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investment is not associated with price adjustment, on a dollar basis,
is 0.043. Fourth, in the results of Model 4 of Table 5, after
accounting for whether greater San Francisco area lawyers
participate, the p-value for rejecting the hypothesis that the general
frequency of law firm investment is not associated with price
adjustment, on a percentage basis, is 0.046. Fifth, in the results of
Model 5 of Table 5, after accounting for whether greater San
Francisco area lawyers participate, the p-value for rejecting the
hypothesis that the general frequency of law firm investment, when
interacted with the participation of lawyers not from the greater San
Francisco area, is not associated with price adjustment, on a dollar
basis, is 0.016. Sixth, in the results of Model 6 of Table 5, after
accounting for whether greater San Francisco area lawyers
participate, the p-value for rejecting the hypothesis that the general
frequency of law firm investment, when interacted with the
participation of lawyers not from the greater San Francisco area, is
not associated with price adjustment, on a percentage basis, is 0.0 19.
If one is satisfied with concluding p-values of approximately 0.06
are consistent with rejecting the null hypothesis, one can view the first
and second listed results as providing some support consistent with
the view that any price association of law firm investment extends to
parts of the country outside the greater San Francisco area, i.e., it is
not limited to the participation of greater San Francisco area lawyers.
The third through sixth identified results also provide some evidence
consistent with the view that, whatever price association exists for law
firm investments in clients, it is not merely a phenomenon associated
with the participation of greater San Francisco area lawyers. Those
results all indicate that frequency of investment in clients is associated
with upward price adjustments, whether viewed for lawyers
throughout the country (the results identified after "third" and
"fourth," above) or whether viewed for lawyers outside the greater
San Francisco area (the results after "fifth" and "sixth," above).
Some caution is necessary, however, in considering the results from
this type of model. Although the model can indicate association, it
does not prove causation. There is, however, one unambiguously
incorrect manner of interpreting the results: one cannot look at the
results for the variables log(] + Law Firm Investment ($)) in Model 4 of
Table 4 and Not San Francisco x log(] + Law Firm Investment ($)) in
Model 6 of Table 4 and conclude there is no price association of law
firm investments and the participation of non-greater San Francisco
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area lawyers. The results for the parameter estimates are of the
predicted signs, but thep-values for those two results are, respectively,
0.298 and 0.311. It is not clear why those models, which have a
dependent variable in the form of a percentage price change, as
opposed to a dollar amount of price change, and that have a
somewhat decreased adjusted R2 relative to their counterparts having
a different dependent variable formulation, produce results not
statistically significant at customary levels, whereas the p-values for
the corresponding models having a dependent variable in the form of
a dollar price change are approximately 0.06. Even if those results
were the only results, i.e., disregarding all the other results, it would
be incorrect to assert that a parameter estimate of the expected sign
and having a p-value of approximately 0.3 signifies there is no
relationship.17
Those results, on their own, simply provide a
confidence interval centered about a point having the expected, i.e.,
positive, sign, where the tails of the confidence interval include a true
parameter of zero. To conclude that law firm investment is not
associated with a positive price adjustment, one would have to find a
statistically significant relationship of the opposite sign. The models
do not yield those results. Moreover, as noted above,"'7 embedded in
the model formulation is a bias against finding results. The statistical
evidence consistent with a price association, however, includes
various other results mentioned above consistent with a relationship
not confined to the participation of greater San Francisco area
lawyers.
Embellishment of the "strength" of the relationship is a matter of
judgment, on which reasonable minds may differ. For example,
Bohn and Choi describe results significant at only the twenty percent
level, i.e., "weaker" than significance at the ten percent level, as
providing "strong evidence."' 72 Reasonable minds can differ in
associating adjectives reflecting a subjective assessment to the
170

SeeDAMODARN. GUJARATI, BASIC ECONOMETRICS 129 (3d ed. 1995) ("Ifon the basis

of a test of significance... we decide to 'accept' the null hypothesis, all we are saying is that
on the basis of the sample evidence we have no reason to reject it; we are not saying that the
null hypothesis is true beyond any doubt .... Better still... 'the conclusion of a statistical
test is "do not reject" rather than "accept." "' (emphasis added) (quotingJAN KMENTA,
ELEMENTS OF ECONOMETRICS 114 (1971)).
17
' See supra p. 4 .
172 James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraudin the Nv-Issues Market Empirical
Evidenceon Securities
ClassActions, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 903, 953 (1996).
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significance of a statistical relationship. In the author's view, the
statistics ultimately speak for themselves; the purpose of this Article
is to report what, to the author's knowledge, are the first results to
address the price relationship of law firm investments in IPOs.
Further embellishment of the significance of this relationship would
be simply hand-waving. The results, however, clearly do not
conclusively prove these law firm investments affect how lawyers
perform their professional obligations (although it seems somewhat
self-serving for lawyers to assert that they, unique among
professionals, are able to disregard their financial incentives in
performing their professional obligations). Further investigation may
yield additional information bearing on the origins of the relevant
relationships.
No judgment is made concerning whether the relationship is the
product of conscious malfeasance.' 73 A burgeoning "behavioralist"
literature argues that financial incentives can produce subconscious
74
acts consistent with those incentives. 1
E. Implications
To the extent one believes there is a relationship between law firm
investment and IPO pricing, such a relationship would raise a
number of policy concerns. Three merit mention. First, the scope of
disclosure currently provided is insufficient to convey information
relevant to a material relationship. Current disclosure frequently
does not address when law firms acquired their interests. As law firm
financial interests in clients are significantly associated with pricing in

173 Seegenerally D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., supra note 19, at 7 (noting that investments
can "wittingly or unwittingly" influence performance of professional services).
"24E.g., ChristineJolls et al., A BedavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv.

1471, 1502-04 (1998) (detailing the bias and addressing the extent to which lawyers may be
affected to a lesser extent); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and BehavioralScience:
Removing the Rationality Asswnption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051, 1093-95
(2000) (detailing the bias); Donald C. Langevoort, OrganizedIllusions: A Behavioral Theory of
Why CorporationsMislead StockMarket Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV.
101, 143-46 (1997) (same); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the
Rults: The Role ofLawyers in TransmittingLegal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. LJ. 375, 428 30
(1997) (discussing the bias within the provision oflegal services); Robert A. Prentice, The Case
of the IrrationalAuditor:A BehavioralInsight into Securities FraudLitigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 133,
168-70 (2000) (detailing the bias).
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some model specifications, it would seem appropriate to require
disclosure of the timing of those investments.
An assessment of the desirability of requiring this disclosure
depends on the value of the disclosure as well as the cost of making
the disclosure. The value cannot be fully assessed, because the
information has not been disclosed uniformly in the past.
Nevertheless, the information is relevant to a relationship that is
significant, which militates in favor of the desirability of the
disclosure. Moreover, the cost of making the disclosure should not be
large. Because these investments can give rise to conflicts of interest
or potential violations of rules of professional responsibility, one
would hope law firms making these investments would keep records
sufficient to allow relatively easy generation of the required
information.
The second possible implication involves whether these interests
should be proscribed. The answer to this question depends on one's
assessment of the role played by law firms. One view would look to
the role the SEC requires lawyers to fulfill. A registration statement
for an IPO of stock is required to include an opinion of counsel. 7 '
However, the scope of the required opinion is extremely limited; the
issuer must provide an opinion of counsel as to the legality of the
securities being registered, indicating whether they will, when sold, be
legally issued, fully paid and non-assessable. 76
' It does not seem likely
that a law firm's investment would affect the manner of issuing such
an opinion. The matter is too straightforward and too fundamental.
If the public is only entitled to rely on the participating law firm to
the extent of assuring the accuracy of that legal opinion, there would
be little need, in order to protect the investing public, to prevent law
firms from having investments in clients they take public. However,
one can perceive lawyers as fulfilling a larger role for the investing
public. It is public knowledge that the conditions to the closing of an
IPO will include the delivery of an opinion of counsel to the issuer
concerning the accuracy of the disclosure. This condition may be
explicitly set forth in a publicly available document-the form of

175
176

17 C.F.R. §§ 228.601 exhibit thU., 229.601 exhibit tbl. (2000).
Id. §§ 228.601(b)(5), 229.601(bX5).
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underwriting agreement filed as an exhibit to the corresponding
registration statement.' 77
One could argue that it is not relevant whether the public can rely
on this more detailed opinion, in the sense of investors being able
successfully to sue the law firm if this opinion is inaccurate. One
might argue that if a law firm is named as participating in an offering,
the investing public is entitled to expect some appropriate level of
performance by that law firm, even if there is no available legal
remedy. The argument would conclude that the evidence is
consistent with these investments being associated with changes in law
firm behavior and therefore should be proscribed. The evidence
reported in this paper provides one factor relevant to assessing that
issue. For those persuaded by the existence of a price association, the
evidence is not conclusive as to whether the investments should be
proscribed, because any price association would be consistent with
either (i) a general willingness to invest in clients being associated with
a more general, different approach to professional obligations
generally"'7 or (ii) an investment in a client affecting representation of
that client.
This policy consideration should only be assessed in its context. To
the extent evidence is less than compelling, or an alternative
perspective provides conflicting results, one has to assess both the
harm from failing to proscribe these relationships, if they adversely
affect lawyer performance, and the harm from proscribing these
relationships where they in fact do not affect law firm performance.
No persuasive evidence has been presented that clients will be unable
to receive necessary legal advice unless their counsel takes equity
stakes. Even for cash-strapped firms, equity is not the only solution.
Debt, which would raise diminished conflicts of interest, could be
used in those cases.
The third, and perhaps most interesting, implication involves due
diligence. One primary function of the more detailed legal opinion

177

Id. §§ 228.601 exhibit tbl. (requiring the filing of the underwriting agreement as an

exhibit to the registration statement), 229.601 exhibit tbl. (same); John E. Riley, Letters of
Intent and UnderwritingAgreements in Initial Public Offerings, in How TO PREPARE AN INITIAL
PUBLICOFIFERING 1995,supranote 101, at 423,494 (form underwriting agreement detailing
the negative assurance to be provided in the legal opinion to be delivered at closing).
1711 See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
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referenced above, 7 1 which is delivered at the closing, is to provide a
basis for a potential due diligence defense. The opinion will typically
indicate that nothing has come to the attention of the law firm that
would lead it to believe the offering materials are false or
misleading.' ° The final inquiry is, then, whether reliance by an
underwriter or other person sued for violation of section 11 or section
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933181 on an opinion of counsel
issued by a law firm that had an investment in the particular issuer,
has such an interest, could support a due diligence
or that frequently
182
defense.
The due diligence defense provided in section 11 provides: "[he
standard of reasonableness shall be that required of a prudent man in
the management of his own property." 113 The evidence reported
above can be viewed as consistent with these law firm investments
affecting the extent to which a due diligence defense should be
provided by reliance on an opinion of counsel that had an interest in
the issuer or that frequently has an interest in issuers being taken
public.
As a general matter, one is less likely to rely on the advice of a third
party where the third party has a potential conflict of interest. The
difference here is that there is some statistical evidence consistent with
this potential conflict of interest affecting how the third parties
perform their duties. The evidence is not definitive, in that not all
pertinent parameter estimates are statistically significant at customary
levels and investments between the time of the beauty pageant and
the final pricing may account for the identified relationship. And, as
is the case with all such models, there may be other, unforseen factors
that explain the relationship, in whole or in part. Nevertheless, this

2.

IC'

See supra note 117.
See id.

15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(1994 & Supp. V 1999).

12

Coffee makes a related point. He argues the standard of liability under existing

securities laws should be increased for an attorney having an interest, at an unspecified level,
in his client. Coffee, supra note 4.
183 15

U.S.C. § 77k(c). See also 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (2000) (identifying factors relevant to

making that determination). Section 12(a)(2) provides a similar defense, by stating that a
person will only be liable under that section where he "shall not sustain the burden of proof
that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such
" 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2).
untruth or omission .....
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circumstance is one of the unusual cases where one can start to
quantify the consequences of potential conflicts of interest.
V. CONCLUSION

This Article has examines two principal hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Law firm investments in clients diminish the extent
to which those law firms require issuers to disclose adverse
information in IPO prospectuses.
Hypothesis 2: Those law firms that are willing to invest in their
clients are generally less aggressive in requiring their clients, in their
IPOs, to disclose adverse information in their IPO prospectuses.
Collectively, the results presented in this article can be viewed as
consistent with the notion that there is a relationship between law
firm investment and price adjustment in IPOs (and they certainly are
not inconsistent with that notion). With the available data, the
precise origin of the relationship cannot be ascertained. It is not out
of the mainstream of legal scholarship to argue that the actions of law
firms may be influenced by their incentives. That people's actions are
influenced by their financial incentives is a principal tenet of much
legal scholarship and analysis.184 It would be more surprising to argue
the converse-that lawyers are uniquely (or at least unusually)
impervious to the influence of their own financial interests.
It is well understood that the absence of a statistically significant
relationship does not prove the absence of a relationship. Even if no
statistically significant relationship had been found between these law
firm investments and law firm performance in a particular model,
that would not imply there is no such relationship. That is
particularly the case where, as here, there is a strong theoretical basis
for expecting there to be such a relationship.
Nevertheless, it is possible that other factors account for the
statistically significant results or that the relationships will change over
time, as has been reported in other literature examining offerings. 8' 5
One might therefore view this article as the first in what may be a
series of attempts to remove from the realm of mere speculation the
investigation and analysis of the implications of law firm investments
in their clients.

18' See supra note 58 and accompanying text.

...See supra text accompanying note 169.

